

International Struggle for United Front
Struggle of the Chinese Red Army
Fifteenth Anniversary of the Y. C. I.

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THE BIOGRAPHY OF A PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARY

THIRTY years—the whole of his conscious life—Comrade Kirov devoted unstintingly to the working class and the Party.

Sergei Mironovich (his Party names were Sergei, Serge, and Kostrikov) was born in 1886 in the little provincial town of Urzhum, in what was formerly the Vyatka Province. Here were spent the first few years of his life. His childhood was drab and joyless. In early childhood he lost his parents. Together with his two sisters he was adopted by his grandmother. The entire family lived on three rubles a month. Sergei Mironovich long remembered the privations of these years. They lived in semi-starvation, stretching every kopek. But even so the grandmother could not keep her grandchildren, and at the age of seven the grandson was sent to an orphanage. Here Kirov spent one year. At the orphanage he already displayed his unusual abilities and quick wits. He successfully finished elementary school and then the city secondary school. He did well at school, and, after graduating, entered the Kazan Mechanical and Technical School.

Kazan, the university, the revolutionary students—here the first independent stage of his life began. And here were formed the first ties which subsequently bound up the whole of Comrade Kirov's life with the revolutionary struggle.

The little town of Urzhum was one of the many places in the Vyatka Province to which the tsarist government used to exile revolutionaries, and it was they who were Comrade Kirov's first real teachers. He knew many of them personally in his early youth. Later, when returning from Kazan for his vacation, Sergei Mironovich gradually extended his connections with the political exiles, who provided him with illegal literature and with whom he had long talks.

This was the political school which prepared Kirov, a student at the Kazan Technical School, for further political activity in the circles of the revolutionary students in Kazan. At the time Comrade Kirov was not yet eighteen. But the revolutionary views of a Social-Democrat were already assuming definite shape in his mind.

In the autumn of 1904, Comrade Kirov went to Tomsk, intending to enter the Institute of Technology. Here, in the Tomsk general study courses, he made connections with the local Social-Democratic organization. This was an important milestone in Comrade Kirov's life. It already foreshadowed the future professional revolutionary.

In Kazan Comrade Kirov soon found himself in the very midst of Party work. He took active part in organizing the armed demonstration in January

1905, in reply to "Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg. He was detected by the tsarist spies. On February 2, 1905, he was arrested at an illegal Party meeting and kept in prison for several months. This was the baptism by fire with which, as Sergei Mironovich was fond of putting it, real revolutionary work begins.

At the time Comrade Kirov already belonged to the then small group of Bolsheviks in Tomsk. From day to day he worked tirelessly for the Party, distributing illegal literature, working as agitator in small circles, speaking among workers. Comrade Kirov was well known in revolutionary circles in Tomsk, and was soon elected to the Tomsk Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. The Party Committee entrusted to him one of the most important and difficult tasks—the managing of an illegal Party printshop.

The whole of 1905 Comrade Kirov spent in Tomsk and at the Taiga station, where he organized a highly successful railwaymen's strike. Early in 1906 the Party Committee charged Comrade Kirov with the urgent task of procuring a good printing press in Moscow or St. Petersburg for the local Party printshop. But Comrade Kirov did not succeed in accomplishing this task, for on the day of his scheduled departure he was tracked down by the secret police and again sent to prison. He was held under the notorious Article 126 of the tsarist Criminal Code. A year of life and work was lost in prison. But as soon as the young proletarian fighter was again free he immediately set out to accomplish the task given him by the Party. In a Tomsk cellar, along with a group of other comrades, Sergei Mironovich organized an underground printshop which was excellently fitted to deceive the tsarist police. Arrest again interrupted the work when it was almost accomplished. The investigation lasted many months. The secret police had no evidence, but it already sensed a "dangerous state criminal" in Kirov and kept him in prison. Finally the trial took place (the charge was the one brought up at his first arrest). Comrade Kirov was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in a fortress.

The solitary confinement cell in the Tomsk suburban prison was Comrade Kirov's revolutionary university. He crossed the threshold of his cell fully convinced that sooner or later he would leave it and that meanwhile he must use the time for self-education. These were hard years. Punitive expeditions raged all around and gallows were reared. The solitary confinement wing of Tomsk prison was the last step to the scaffold for many a revolutionary. The silence of the night was often rent by the fare-

well cries of the condemned. These three years tempered Comrade Kirov's nerves and will. After his release Comrade Kirov went to Irkutsk. In the capital of Eastern Siberia the reaction was especially fierce. The Party organization was smashed. Besides this, owing to an accident (the discovery of the printshop in Tomsk) the tsarist secret police received in its hands fresh evidence against Kirov. He had to leave Siberia.

And so he went to Vladikavkaz. Here there was no organization—only individual comrades. Here Comrade Kirov lived and worked illegally for several years. Then the war began. In 1915 he was arrested for the fourth time and sent to Tomsk, where he spent another year in prison. He was sentenced to exile to the Narym Region, but the February Revolution intervened.

In this revolution Comrade Kirov took a direct part as member of the Vladikavkaz Committee of the Social-Democratic organization. He worked in Vladikavkaz during the whole of 1917. And when the October Revolution broke out in the Caucasus Comrade Kirov was one of the organizers of the Soviet Power and leaders of the armed struggle against the White Cossack bands. He was sent by the Bolshevik organization to Moscow for arms and munitions for the Caucasian Red front, then being formed.

In 1918 Comrade Kirov tried to make his way to the Caucasus via Tsaritsyn with a large supply of munitions. But it was already too late. The White bands had succeeded in pressing back the scattered guerilla detachments of the Caucasian Red Army. The Party knew Comrade Kirov to be a staunch fighter, steeled in battle; it knew his clear mind, his calm resoluteness and his self-sacrificing devotion to the proletarian revolution. He was entrusted with one of the most responsible tasks in the fight against counter-revolution—the defense of Astrakhan. Kirov wrote one of the most glorious pages in the history of the Civil War. Here, on the lower Volga, he rallied and reorganized the Eleventh Army. Astrakhan remained in the hands of the Soviets, for the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eleventh Army, which defended the fortress of the Soviets on the Volga, was fired with the inexhaustible energy of Sergei Mironovich.

Leading the Eleventh Army, Comrade Kirov took part in smashing Denikin and re-establishing Soviet Power in the North Caucasus and in Baku.

When relations between Soviet Azerbaijan and Menshevik Georgia became strained, the Soviet government appointed Comrade Kirov the plenipotentiary representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Tiflis. Some-

what later, Sergei Mironovich was entrusted with another important mission—as member of the Soviet delegation he took part in the peace negotiations with Poland. After this he again did Party work in the North Caucasus and in Azerbaijan, where Comrade Kirov worked as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and member of the Trans-Caucasian Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U. Comrade Kirov as a prominent Party leader did much to establish and consolidate the power of the Soviets in the North Caucasus and in Transcaucasia. The proletariat of Baku loved and valued its leader and friend, Comrade Kirov.

The Party well knew Comrade Kirov. At the Tenth Party Congress he was elected alternate member of the Central Committee, and at the Eleventh Congress member of the Central Committee of the Party. An ardent revolutionary, an uncompromising enemy of the least deviation from Bolshevism, from Leninism, Comrade Kirov was one of the outstanding fighters for the Party, for the Central Committee, for the triumph of socialism in our country. Kirov was in the front ranks when the Party, led by Comrade Stalin, waged a struggle against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, the Zinoviev opposition and the Right opportunists. Kirov was one of the closest comrades, pupils and friends of the great Stalin.

In 1926, after the smashing of the Zinoviev opposition, Comrade Kirov became Secretary of the Leningrad Province Committee of the C.P.S.U. and of the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., and was made an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. From 1928 on he was Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U., from 1930 on he was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., and in 1934 was a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., and Secretary of the Leningrad City and Regional Committees of the Party. Comrade Kirov was also a member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

Comrade Kirov was the beloved leader of the Leningrad workers, among whom his prestige was enormous. He was indeed a tribune whose entire life is a glorious page in the chronicle of the heroic years of the proletarian revolution and its great conquests. For thirty years Comrade Kirov fought as a true Bolshevik for the cause of the working class, and as such death overtook him at his fighting post.

FOR THE UNITED FRONT OF STRUGGLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAT

THE Executive Committee of the Second International, which met in Paris on November 13-16, 1934, *rejected* the proposal of the Communist International to enter into a *united front* to defend and to help the fighting proletariat of Spain.

It took the Second International more than one month to give a reply to the proposal made by the Comintern,

"... that immediate joint action be undertaken both in support of the fighting Spanish proletariat and in the struggle against support being given to the Lerroux government by the governments of other capitalist countries." *

The Comintern delegation, Comrades Cachin and Thorez, who met the representatives of the Second International, Vandervelde and F. Adler, on October 15, proposed forms of joint action that were perfectly concrete, practical and acceptable to the broad masses of workers, viz:

"1. Joint demonstrations and meetings with the following slogan: 'Down with the Lerroux government, all for the defense of the Spanish workers and peasants fighting against reaction.'

"2. Trade union organizations to draw up a common plan of action aiming at preventing the transport of troops and ammunitions for the Lerroux government.

"3. Socialist and Communist parliamentary fractions to act jointly in all countries, and to demand that Parliament be called to make a protest against the barbarous shootings whose victims the Spanish people are now. Similar action to be organized by Socialist and Communist municipalities.

"4. Immediate, material assistance to be afforded, jointly, to the fighting Spanish proletariat and the victims of repression."

The representatives of the Second International, Vandervelde, its president, and Adler, its secretary, on purely formal grounds, referred to the fact that only the Executive Committee of the Second International could decide this question and refused to indicate the attitude of the Bureau of the E.C. of the Second International toward the proposal made by the Comintern.

Further, they referred, on the same formal grounds, to the restrictions placed upon their mandate and refused to speak along with the representatives of the Comintern at at least one of the meetings organized jointly by the Communist and Socialist Parties of France. They further refused to speed

up the calling together of the E.C. of the Second International. At last, over a month later, the majority of the E.C. of the Second International have rejected the proposal made by the Comintern, although, it is true, they are no longer in a position to insist upon the prohibition of the united front in those countries where it has been brought about.

These are the facts. They prove that, as an International organization, the Second International *has rejected all forms, even the most elementary, of the joint expression of class solidarity by the international proletariat on behalf of the fighting Spanish proletariat.* In order to cover up this fact, the antagonists of the united front in the ranks of the Second International have done their utmost to slander the proposal made by the Comintern, and F. Adler, in opening the meeting of the E.C. of the Second International, resorted (not for the first time) to calumnious attacks to the effect that "the proposal made by the Comintern came too late", and therefore the proposal is "an unscrupulous maneuver". Friedrich Adler cannot but be aware of the fact, known to the proletarians of all countries, that the armed struggle of the Spanish proletariat against the bestial fascist bands of Lerroux and Robles is going on to this very day in the most industrial provinces of Spain, in Asturias and Biscay, and that therefore the Comintern proposal is not at all too late.

Is not the best answer to Adler and all the opponents of the united front in the E.C. of the Second International the fact that the chief journal of the bloody hangman, Gil Robles, the *El Debate* of November 15, gave the following appraisal of the resolution adopted by the E.C. of the Second International:

"... even the Socialist International is against the insurgents in Asturias."

This was the estimate given of the position taken up by the Second International by the chief organ of the reactionary fascist bourgeoisie of Spain. Can the Spanish proletariat, can the workers who support the united front in other countries, characterize the position taken up by the majority of the E.C. of the Second International as anything other than *strike-breaking*?

What excuses does the E.C. of the Second International make in the attempt to justify its refusal?

First of all, in rejecting the proposal made by the Communist International to organize immediate, joint demonstrations and meetings, the E.C. of the

* Published in *PHumanite*, October 11, 1934.

Second International refers to "the solidarity campaign that was begun even before the Comintern proposal was made". Can this "excuse" hide from the working masses the obvious truth that if the Second International had agreed to joint action, this would not only have further stimulated the solidarity campaign and the struggle of the Spanish workers themselves, but joint action of this kind on the part of the two Internationals would have strengthened the position and the struggle of the proletariat in other countries, and a united front of this kind on the part of the international proletariat would have delivered a mighty blow against fascist reaction not only in Spain, but in other countries?

By way of concrete examples of the campaign of solidarity being conducted by the Second International, the E.C. in its reply refers to France and Belgium. In France, as we know, on the initiative of the Communist Party of France and thanks to its untiring work among the masses, agreement was arrived at, before the events took place in Spain, regarding the united front between the Socialist and Communist Parties, despite its general prohibition by the Second International; and during the events in Spain joint action was organized in defense of the Spanish revolution.

Referring to Belgium, the leaders of the Second International emphasize the fact in their reply that "in Belgium, where there is no Communist Party of importance, a big meeting was arranged, devoted to the Spanish events, where the president of the Labor and Socialist International made a speech". The "argument" that it is impossible to develop the united front on an international scale in view of the small membership of the Communist Parties in some countries has been advanced previously by the leaders of the Second International, and in particular by Vandervelde in connection with the negotiations between the representatives of the Second and Third Internationals in Brussels. The *Pravda*, the central organ of the C.P. of the Soviet Union, has given a worthy retort to this:

"The leaders of the Second International have missed the fact that besides several mass parties in capitalist countries, the Communist International includes the C.P.S.U., which stands at the head of proletarian dictatorship, which is building socialism in the U.S.S.R. over one-sixth of the globe. Is it necessary to speak of the lack of comparison from all points of view of such magnitudes as the C.P.S.U. and the Labor Party!"

Moreover, the leaders of the Second International should not forget that it is not so long ago since the leaders of Austrian and Spanish Social-Democracy, particularly Otto Bauer, used this same "argument" against the united front, and that a year has not yet passed since the working masses have

turned towards the Communists, and the relation of forces in the working class of these countries has changed sharply and is still changing in favor of the Communist Party.

Secondly, in reply to the proposal made by the Communist International to afford immediate material assistance to the fighting workers of Spain and the victims of repression, the E.C. of the Second International states that "meanwhile we have collected detailed information on the position in Spain, and our Comrade Oriol, who was delegated to Spain, made an extremely important report to the meeting of our E.C., which will soon be published". Needless to say, this reply about the publication of Oriol's report some time in the future, instead of affording immediate material assistance to the Spanish workers, can only call forth a feeling of indignation from all honest proletarians. Incidentally, as can be seen from the *Populaire* of November 15, 1934, Oriol's mission was to hand a letter to the president of the Spanish Republic, M. Zamora, which stated this:

"I should like to have a word from you which will make it possible for me to tell my comrades that the republic will not adopt repression towards those who created it, and will not betray our organizations, their best fighters and their leaders to the most ferocious enemies of freedom who have become more insolent than ever before throughout the world. Permit an enthusiastic friend of Spain, permit Republicans and Socialists, still to nourish hope in this direction."

This is the "moving letter of Vensan Oriol" (as the *Populaire* christened it), on the magic effect of which the Second International builds up its . . . help to the fighting proletariat of Spain. Oriol's "hope" that the interference of the president of a republic on the road to fascism would be a substitute for the struggle against fascism, was justified to the same extent as, at another date, the hope of German Social-Democracy was justified concerning the interference of Hindenburg against Hitler. The government of Zamora, who is so "friendly" towards Oriol, immediately prohibited all trade union organizations in Spain and began to smash them up, and increased the fascist terror against the toilers still further. This is how things stand with regard to the other "argument" of the E.C. of the L.S.I. against the united front of struggle of the international proletariat.

Thirdly, in rejecting the proposal of the Communist International to act jointly against support to the Lerroix government, the proposal that the trade union organizations should elaborate a common plan of action with a view to preventing the transport of troops and ammunition for this government, and to making joint protests in Parliament and the municipalities against the bloody terror raging in Spain,

the E.C. of the Second International is only repeating what Vandervelde and Adler referred to during the negotiations in Brussels, namely, that,

"... the position in individual parties affiliated to our International differs according to the situation existing in each country."

But the different position existing in the different sections of the Second International *did not prevent* the E.C. prohibiting the conclusion of the united front in individual countries until such time as agreement was reached between the Internationals, in its resolution of March 18-19, 1933, in reply to the appeal made by the Comintern of March 5, 1933, which recommended its Sections to enter into an agreement for the united front with the Social-Democratic Parties on the basis of the concrete conditions existing in their countries.

Thus, in 1933, when Hitler's fascist dictatorship was set up, and fascist terror stalked throughout Germany, the Second International forbade the conclusion of the united front in separate countries, the excuse being that agreement was first of all necessary between the Internationals; and now, in 1934, when fascism is advancing against the Spanish revolution, when international joint action has been prepared for by the big successes achieved by the Communist Party in establishing the united front in several countries, the Second International refuses to establish a united front between the Internationals, *the excuse being the different position existing in the Social-Democratic Parties in different countries.*

We all know that the central committees of several of the Social-Democratic Parties (and they form the majority), backed up by, and on the basis of, the resolution of the Second International of March, 1932, rejected the proposal of the Communists for the establishment of a united front, and especially the proposal for joint action in defense of the Spanish revolution. Now, by giving freedom to its sections, the E.C. of the Second International gives *advance sanction* to the policy of the leaders of those Social-Democratic Parties who will hinder and sabotage the united front of the proletariat on the grounds of the peculiar features of their particular country.

All the "reasons" and "arguments" put forward in reply by the E.C. of the Second International cannot hide the fact that the *Second International does not want to organize the united front of struggle of the workers of all countries against fascism, war, and the capitalist offensive. What are the real reasons for the refusal of the Second International to adopt the united front of the struggle of the world proletariat?*

The main reason is that the Second International is an organization that *pursues the policy of class*

collaboration with the bourgeoisie. This policy was and remains *the main obstacle* to the realization of the united front of struggle of the proletariat.

The last meeting of the Second International is a glaring confirmation of this.

The parties that were in favor of categorically and unconditionally rejecting the proposal made by the Comintern were those that pursue a policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, *in the shape of participation in bourgeois governments*, such as the Social-Democratic Parties of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, as well as those parties which intend, in the near future, to participate in bourgeois governments, such as the British Labor Party, the Social-Democrats in Holland, and others. It should be emphasized that it is just these parties that constitute the *majority* in the E.C. of the Second International.

Long before the meeting of the E.C. of the Second International, a furious campaign against accepting the proposals of the E.C.C.I. on the united front was launched in the columns of the press of these parties. The central organ of the Danish Social-Democrats, *The Social-Democrat*, wrote outright on October 18:

"One must not expect any positive results from these negotiations [between the Second and Third International—*Ed.*], neither do we want it."

The leader of Dutch Social-Democracy, Albarda, published a series of articles in the leading organ of the party, the *Het Volk*, in October, in which he threatened the Second International with a split if the Comintern proposal for the united front were accepted. He foretold two possibilities: the first, that the E.C. would give the parties a free hand on this question; and the second, that the International would split into two parts. The *Nin Tid* (the central organ of Swedish Social-Democracy) also reported the organizational measures that were taken by the enemies of the united front in connection with the appeal of the Comintern to the Second International.

"During the last few days, we have had a lively exchange of opinions with the Social-Democratic Parties of Denmark, Holland and Great Britain. These parties, as is Swedish Social-Democracy, *are decidedly against even negotiations being carried on with Moscow.* It is out of the question that the Socialist Labor International should pass any decision on this question against the clearly expressed desire of its *strongest and most influential parties.*"

And a few days later the *Nin Tid* openly threatened a *split*:

"We, and our party comrades in Denmark, Holland and England, find that Vandervelde and Adler

undertook entirely futile work. . . . One thing is clear: if any sort of 'united front' is formed with Moscow, it will be done without the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden, Denmark and Holland, and the International will have to choose between these parties and Moscow."

One of the main forces preventing any agreement on the united front being arrived at between the Internationals is the British Labor Party. Meanwhile, in England itself, the forces of fascism are developing, which can be held back by a militant united front of the proletariat.

True, the leaders of the British Labor Party are trying to hide their resistance to the united front by references to their sympathy for the U.S.S.R., and by declaring that support for the U.S.S.R. in England does not require a united front with the Communists, but votes cast in favor of a Labor government. This attempt to set off the defense of the U.S.S.R. against the struggle against the bourgeoisie of their own country has been an attempt to deceive the workers. The workers, including the English proletarians who really wish to prevent an onslaught on the U.S.S.R., know that the two preceding Labor governments did not slacken the preparations made by English imperialism for a counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R., and are becoming more and more convinced that by developing the struggle of the broad masses—by strengthening and extending the united front against fascism, war and the capitalist offensive—they are also actually defending the U.S.S.R., the base of world proletarian revolution, the mighty bulwark of the revolutionary proletarian front, in its struggle against the reactionary fascist front of the bourgeoisie.

The last meeting of the E.C. of the L.S.I. once more revealed that the Labor and Socialist International is passing through a deep ideological and political crisis, and a process of organizational collapse. The depth of the crisis and collapse is proved by the fact that, (1) it was compelled to allow the parties a free hand on the question of the united front (true, after four days' searching after formulas for the rejection of the proposals made by the Comintern), and (2) the special declaration at the E.C. by the representatives of several parties.*

* The central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, the *Nuovo Avanti* of November 21, in the report on the recent plenum of the E.C. of the Second International, describes very vividly the *difficult position in which the E.C. found itself*, in connection with the Comintern proposal:

"When the E.C. met again on the night of the 16th, common ground for agreement had still not yet been found; the text of a letter was produced which on the 3rd and 4th had been approved unanimously, but the last part of which again

Any intensification of the contradictions between the imperialists has always brought about an intensification of the struggle among the parties of the Second International. During the world imperialist war of 1914-1918, the Second International went bankrupt and broke down organizationally. It is not surprising that today again, on the eve of the second round of revolutions and wars, when the contradictions among the imperialists have become extremely intensified, and when "the revolutionary crisis is ripening and will continue to ripen" (Stalin)—that now, there is an ideological-political crisis and a process of organizational collapse going on in the Second International.

But the *decisive thing* that has brought about the present crisis in the Second International is the *historic turn* that is being made by the working class, and first and foremost by the Social-Democratic workers, in connection with the events that are taking place in those European countries where Social-Democracy led the majority of the workers and where fascist dictatorship has been set up or where the danger of fascism is a direct menace, and on the other hand, in connection with the world historic victories of socialism in the U.S.S.R., where the proletariat is guided by the leading Section in the Comintern, the C.P.S.U.

Ever vaster masses of the Social-Democratic workers are becoming convinced of the correctness of the line taken up by the Communists, who have always fought and are still fighting against the Social-Democratic policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie and are developing the struggle of the proletariat on the basis of the united front against the bourgeoisie. They are becoming convinced that this policy of Social-Democracy, whether in the shape of a policy of tolerating the fascization of the State as the lesser evil, or in that of a policy of "only defense" against fascism (Austrian Social-Democracy and others), or in that of again participating in a

raised the question in all scope with two diametrically opposed proposals: in one it was emphasized that it was impossible to make the pact a general one, and in the other, it was proposed to call a conference to discuss the question of the conditions, principle and organizational forms under which collaboration between the two internationals would be possible.

"The second part of the discussion took place in an *extremely tense atmosphere*. It would have been *risky* to take a vote because the E.C. was *divided approximately in two equal parts*, while those who were against unity of action would probably have got the majority of something like 20 votes out of a total of 250 votes.

"And so Vandervelde proposed—and the E.C. approved it—to delete the passage under dispute, which in sporting language is called 'ending a draw'."

"bourgeois government after the fascist dictatorship has been overthrown (Spanish Social-Democracy in the first years after the 1931 revolution, etc.)—will not save the toilers from fascism, but is helping fascism to muster its forces, will not stave off the road to fascism, but will clear the way for fascism to power.

It is just this that explains why, unlike their behavior in previous years, the masses of the Social-Democratic workers and whole Social-Democratic organizations are now seizing upon the proposal of the Communist Party for the united front.

It is just this that explains why in countries like France, Austria and Spain, where the Communists have been able to guide this urge of the workers for a united front, and have been able independently to develop the struggle of the masses against fascism, the united front between the Social-Democratic and Communist Parties has been realized. And this, in turn, explains why the Second International has now been unable to annul the agreement on the united front between the Socialist and Communist Parties in places where it has already been brought about.

CONCERNING THE SPECIAL DECLARATION OF THE MINORITY OF THE E.C. OF THE L.S.I.

The process of revolutionary development being undergone by the Social-Democratic workers who are breaking down all barriers in the path to the united front with the Communists—and this is the most characteristic point about the present crisis in the Second International—has brought about and cannot fail to bring about friction and strife inside the E.C. of the Second International itself. At the meeting of the E.C., the representatives of several sections of the Second International presented a minority special declaration.

The signatories to this special declaration are *not* homogeneous. Besides the big parties of the Second International, like the Social-Democratic Parties of France and Spain, which have already entered into agreement with the Communist Parties, the declaration was signed by the representatives of Swiss Social-Democracy, who have more than once up to the present rejected proposals for a united front in Switzerland, representatives of the Polish Bund who recently broke the agreement with the Communist Party of Poland on the united front.

Finally, among the signatories of the special declaration there is Fedor Dan, also a representative of a section of the Second International who represents the emigrant remnants of the same Menshevik Party that fought and is still fighting against the Soviet government, that fought alongside the interventionists during the civil war, supplying ministers for white-guard governments, that took part in uprisings (the Georgian Mensheviks organized a counter-revolu-

tionary uprising in Georgia even as late as in 1924, and now the Georgian Mensheviks in emigration openly speak about the need for preparing for a new uprising), and in recent years, as the trial of the Mensheviks showed in 1931, prominent leaders of this party engaged in wrecking work against socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., and provided secret materials for the headquarters staffs of the capitalist governments who are preparing a new counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R.

WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THIS MINORITY?

In their special declaration they declare that the E.C. of the Second International,

"... should have renewed the proposal of March, 1933, and have asked the Comintern whether it was prepared, on the basis of complete equality of all parties . . . to seek for conditions for unity of action on an international scale, against war, in defense of democratic rights in those countries where they exist, and for revolutionary struggle in the countries where fascism has abolished this freedom."

Unlike the majority of the E.C., the minority in its declaration expressed the *desire* that the Second International should propose to the Comintern that it "should seek for conditions" for joint action on a mass scale. If the declaration is made seriously, and if the parties which have signed it are striving to bring about joint action on an international scale, *then they must not limit themselves to merely wishing this*. But we must at first examine the basis on which the signatories would desire joint action to be established.

The declaration advocates "revolutionary struggle" only in those countries where fascism has destroyed democratic rights. And in all the other countries, where fascism has not up to now completely destroyed these rights, in the countries of bourgeois democracy where the fascist danger is a direct menace, where bourgeois democracy itself is passing through a process of fascist development revolutionary struggle is not needed.

As though the experience of events in Germany, Austria and other countries has not sufficiently shown that the defense of even the most elementary rights of the workers is only possible by way of a consistent revolutionary struggle. And if the declaration limits the recognition of revolutionary struggle to countries where fascism has destroyed democratic rights, then what policy must be operated in all the remaining countries? It is absolutely clear that the rejection of a revolutionary policy in countries where bourgeois democracy prevails can mean nothing else than the sanctioning of a policy of class collaboration for the defense of bourgeois democracy. And

this is exactly how the parties of the Second International which participate in bourgeois governments or who are preparing to participate in such, or who support bourgeois governments, understand the meaning of the term "defense of democratic rights".

The declaration counterposes the countries of fascism, where there is to be revolutionary struggle to countries where there is bourgeois democracy, and where "the defense of democratic rights" is needed. On this most important question the declaration repeats word for word the resolution adopted by the Paris Conference of the Second International in August, 1933, a resolution adopted by all the Parties in the Second International, and which endorsed the policy of German Social-Democracy operated prior to and after the advent of Hitler to power.

But the period since August, 1933, has shown that some Socialist Parties, and primarily a most important section of the Second International, the French Socialist Party, have been compelled under the pressure of the working masses, who are becoming convinced of the fatal path pursued by German and Austrian Social-Democracy, to form a united front with the Communist Party as distinct from the policy of German Social-Democracy which systematically rejected the united front.

If the parties which have signed a separate declaration really desire to achieve the joint action of the international proletariat, then they must not limit themselves to merely wishing it. If the French Socialist workers had waited until the Second International withdrew the ban, the united front would not have been brought about in France to this day. With this as their starting point, the Spanish Communist Party addressed a proposal to the French Socialist Party that a conference be called together at which the Socialists of France, Spain, Switzerland, Italy and Austria could meet with the Communists so as to bring about unity of action.*

The Communists are developing the struggle for the united front of the international proletariat for the purpose of fighting against fascism, war and the capitalist offensive, in defense of the democratic rights of the workers, and for the purpose of leading the masses up to the struggle to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie, and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of Soviet Power.

* This article had already been prepared for the press when the reply of the Socialist Party of France to the proposal of the Communist Party of Spain was received. Without stating any reason, the Socialist Party of France turned down this proposal, and only indicated its agreement to arrange one or several meetings jointly with Communists throughout France. This shows that the Socialist Party of France has no desire really to do anything to bring about joint action on an international scale.

CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN

We must organize, strengthen and extend the united proletarian front of struggle with still greater energy than before. The menace of a new war has increased. The offensive of capital and fascism is increasing. The bourgeoisie is concentrating its forces upon preventing the ripening of the revolutionary crisis. It is necessary now more than ever before to set up the united front of struggle of the international proletariat against the front of the reactionary fascist bourgeoisie. *In making the proposal to the Second International for a united front of struggle in defense of the Spanish workers, the Comintern took as its starting point the fact that it has already been possible, in several countries, to establish the united front between Communist and Socialist Parties, despite all the differences that exist on all questions of program, strategy and tactics, and all the differences of aim that arise in establishing a united front between the Parties of the Second and Third Internationals.*

Despite the refusal of the Second International, the Communist Parties will deepen and extend the united front of struggle of the proletariat with all revolutionary determination.

In those countries where the leaders of the Social-Democratic Parties are against agreement on the united front, the Communists will appeal again and again—on the lines of the Comintern appeal of October 11, 1934—to the leaders of the Social-Democratic Parties, to their local organizations and to the Social-Democratic workers with practical proposals for joint united front action in connection with concrete attacks of capital and fascism. And, what is most important, the Communists will, without waiting for a reply, immediately and independently develop the struggle of the workers against concrete forms of the bourgeois offensive. The Communists will not let themselves be driven off the course they have taken by any refusals on the part of the Social-Democratic leaders.

The Social-Democratic proletarians who are sincerely striving after a united proletarian front with the Communists have become convinced that the united front of struggle with the Communists must be brought about *more boldly* than hitherto. They have become convinced, that the E.C. of the Second International withdrew this ban after the united front had been brought about in certain countries, in spite of the prohibition of the Second International. Now it will be more difficult to hold the Social-Democratic workers back from the united front by referring to discipline and the ban laid down by the leadership. The Social-Democratic workers will reply to the opponents of the united front that discipline is not necessary to fetter the workers and keep them back from the struggle, but

in order to fight *more successfully* against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and war. Practical experience has shown that the numerous barriers that have been set up against the united front inside the Second International could not prevent the *Social-Democratic workers and Social-Democratic organizations in a number of countries from bringing about the united front with the Communists.*

No power exists capable of preventing the Communists from making contacts with the Social-Democratic workers and their local organizations, from establishing a united front with them in workshop, factory and in the localities, districts and provinces, and thus, together with them, laying down the road to a united front throughout the whole country and on an international scale.

In countries where it has been possible to achieve agreement on the united front between the Communist and Socialist Parties, the Communists will strive to strengthen, deepen and extend the united front. In just the same way, the Communists will strive in other countries to organize united front committees in factories, workshops, and depots—local, district, village united front committees of the toilers in town and village, and to organize anti-fascist self-defense on the basis of the united front. The Communists will strive to extend the agreement concerning the tasks and forms of struggle, and achieve the transition to higher forms of struggle (economic and political strikes, etc.).

The Communists will not restrict themselves to the framework of the agreement that has already been arrived at, but will prepare and develop the *struggle* of the masses independently, thus convincing the workers in *actual practice* of the fact that the Communist Party is capable and able to organize and lead their struggle.

The Communists will, on the one hand, unmask those who oppose the united front, by analyzing the concrete excuses they make for rejecting it, and declaring them to be blacklegs in the proletarian cause, and on the other, will criticize in a comradely and business-like manner the hesitation and indeterminateness of those who participate in the united front agreements but who hinder the transition to more mature, higher, forms of struggle.

The instructions given by Lenin in connection with the conference of the three Internationals in 1922 are extremely real in connection with our struggle for the united front today. The Comintern delegation (Radek, Bukharin and others) made a concession to the representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals (Vandervelde, Adler and others), in agreeing to allow representatives of these two Internationals to be present at the trial of the

S.R.'s, and promising that the Soviet government would not bring in the death sentence against the S.R. terrorists. Lenin called this concession a concession to the *reactionary bourgeoisie*, and the role of the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals as "the role of extorters of political concessions". At the conclusion of this article Lenin wrote:

"The representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals need a united front, for they hope to weaken us by excessive concessions on our part; they hope to penetrate into our Communist premises free of charge; they hope through the united front tactics to convince the workers of the correctness of reformist, and the incorrectness of revolutionary, tactics. We need the united front, because we hope to convince the workers of the opposite. We will throw the blame for the mistakes of our Communist representatives on them and on the parties that make these mistakes, trying to learn from the experience of these mistakes and striving to prevent their repetition in the future. But on no account shall we throw the burden of the mistakes of our Communists upon the proletariat, which throughout the world is faced with the offensive of capital. For the sake of helping these masses to fight against capital, of helping them to understand the 'cunning mechanism of two fronts in the whole international economics and the whole of international politics', for the sake of this we have adopted the united front tactics and will pursue them to the end."

Throughout the whole of the struggle for the united front, the Communists are carrying out in practice the instructions left by Lenin, and in spite of all the barriers and obstacles set up by the opponents of the united front from the Second International, they are bringing this struggle to its culmination. The Communists will not allow themselves to be driven from this course by any attempts to replace the united front of struggle, and immediate joint action by discussions about unity (organizational, political) of the working class in general. The Communists will not allow themselves to be driven from this course by the opportunists in their own ranks who hide mistakes made by the Communists from the workers, but will fight mercilessly both against "Left" sectarianism and against the opportunist *danger which is the main danger at the present stage.* In the course of the struggle in a united proletarian front, the Communists will convince the proletarian masses of the correctness of the whole policy of the Communist International, and, standing at the head of the majority of the working class, will lead the millions of the toiling masses forward to the victorious struggle for Soviet Power throughout the world.

CITIZEN VANDERVELDE'S REPLY

By A. MARTYNOV

ON the 10th of October of the present year, the Executive Committee of the Communist International approached the Second International with the proposal to organize joint action in aid to the revolutionary proletariat of Spain. Citizen Vandervelde gave a preliminary reply to this proposal in his article "The Labor and Socialist International and the Communist International" printed in the *Peuple* and the *Populaire*. We now have the official reply of the E.C. of the Second International to the proposal made by the Comintern. Nonetheless, it is worth while dealing with the preliminary reply made by Citizen Vandervelde, for he is the personification of the Second International, and his article is a clear example of the tactics of the Second International.

The 10th of October was a date when the struggle which the heroic Spanish proletariat was carrying on in most difficult conditions was at its height. The duty of proletarian solidarity demanded that everything should be set going in order to render assistance to these fighters and to divert the executioner's axe from the necks of the workers. The Executive Committee of the Comintern which takes as its rule that "at first there was the deed" approached the Second International at this responsible moment with a series of concrete, practical proposals:

1. Joint demonstrations and meetings to be arranged under the slogans of "Down with the Lerroux Government"! "All to the aid of the Spanish workers and peasants fighting against reaction!"

2. The trade union organizations to work out a general plan of action with a view to stopping the transport of troops and munitions for the Lerroux government.

3. The Socialist and Communist Parliamentary groups to act jointly in all countries and to demand the calling of the Parliaments so as to voice a protest against the barbarous shootings of which the Spanish people are now the victims. Similar action to be organized by Socialist and Communist municipalities.

4. Immediate material aid to be rendered to the fighting Spanish proletariat and the victims of repression.

How did the leader of the Second International react to these proposals? He began his reply with a roundabout maneuver.

"In 1933," he wrote, "when Hitler became dictator, but before March 5, the Labor and Socialist International made an insistent call to the Communist International regarding joint action for defense against fascism, and this call remained

fundamentally [Malgre les apparences] without reply, and there has been no reply up to date."

This does not correspond to reality, Citizen Vandervelde. The Bureau of the Second International issued a proclamation on February 18 to the workers of the whole world in which it complained of the "fratricidal war" among the workers, and called on the workers of all lands "to cease mutual attacks" and continued: "The Labor and Socialist International was always ready to conduct negotiations with the Communist International regarding such unity of struggle, so soon as the latter should declare its readiness in this connection". "Such unity of struggle" as formulated in the Manifesto of the Bureau of the Second International was linked up with the "cessation of mutual attacks" between Communists and Socialists, but was not linked up with any sort of concrete program of action against the bourgeoisie. In the first days of March the E.C. of the C.I. issued a manifesto to the workers of all countries in which an absolutely clear reply was given to this indirect and vague proposal. The E.C.C.I. called on all Communist Parties to make an effort to establish the united front on the basis of a concrete program of action together with the Socialist working masses, "through the medium of the Social-Democratic Party", and immediately explained why in the given circumstances it preferred this method of agreement with the various parties to negotiations between the two Internationals. Its motives were the following:

1. The whole policy and activity of the L.S.I. hitherto justifies the Communist International and the Communist Parties in putting no faith in the sincerity of the declaration of the L.S.I. Bureau, which makes its proposal at a moment when in a number of countries, and before all in Germany, the working masses are taking into their own hands the organizing of the united front.

2. Without a concrete program of action against the bourgeoisie any agreement between the parties would be directed against the interests of the working class.

3. Owing to the peculiarity of the conditions, as well as the differences in the concrete fighting tasks confronting the working class in the various countries, an agreement between the Communist and Social-Democratic Parties for definite actions against the bourgeoisie can be carried out most successfully within the confines of each individual country.

The reply was a clear one. Was the E.C.C.I. correct when it adopted this line? Citizen Vandervelde and the E.C. of the Second International have

confirmed the point that the Comintern was fully correct by the whole of their behavior in connection with the last proposal made by the Comintern. *After agreement had already been reached with a number of different Socialist Parties, a point from which the E.C. of the Second International could learn something*, the E.C.C.I. proposed to the latter that a number of concrete steps be taken to assist the Spanish workers, action not brooking of delay for a single day. But what happened?

Vandervelde washed his hands of it, and, raising formal considerations, postponed a final reply for a month, till the 14th of November, when the E.C. of the Second International was to come together. But when the E.C. of the Second International met, it rejected the idea of joint action with the Comintern and limited itself to removing the embargo on the united front established by the different Socialist Parties with the Communist Parties, after the former had already violated this embargo and established a united front with us. The E.C. of the Second International has only shown by this gesture that, as hitherto, it wishes to do away with the united front in those places where, under the pressure of the Party membership, the Socialist Parties have already begun to put it into practice, but that it considers itself powerless (powerless at least just now) to do so.

In his preliminary reply (in his article in *Peuple*) and in his negotiations with Comrades Cachin and Thorez, Citizen Emile Vandervelde explained his refusal to accept immediately the proposal made by the Comintern, and his refusal to speak at even one meeting alongside with the Communists, by stating that he was not a private individual but was the Chairman of the Second International, and that he was aware that a number of Parties in the Second International were less prepared now than ever before to come to an agreement with the Communists on the question of the united front. On these grounds, therefore, he would have to wait for the decision of the Executive Committee.

Citizen Vandervelde thereby authoritatively confirmed the point that the Second International is the kind of "Labor International" in which allowance is made for the refusal to display the most elementary proletarian solidarity, *i.e.*, to speak in plain working class language, where strike-breaking is tolerated. But Citizen Vandervelde, the leader of the Second International, not only recognized the existence of such "workers" parties in the Second International; in his preliminary reply he attempted to explain and to cover up, or, to speak more exactly, to justify the behavior of these parties. He explained the "state of mind" of these by stating that in these countries "the Communist Parties are an almost negligible force, while the Social-Democratic Parties on the contrary,

represent something more than a very important section of the proletariat".

It was absolutely futile for Citizen Vandervelde to attempt to replace politics by arithmetic. With all his diplomatic art, and with all the elegance of his style, he did not succeed in this connection. In Czechoslovakia our Party can compare with the Social-Democratic Party in point of numbers as well, whereas although the membership of our parties in England and Holland is small, yet they have an influence which is growing from day to day, and they are the only parties leading the class struggle of the proletariat in these countries. It is not a question of arithmetic but of politics. The fact is that in these countries the Social-Democratic Parties are either participating in the bourgeois governments or they are counting on being in the government and standing at the head of the bourgeois State tomorrow, and when they are faced with the dilemma of either the united front with the bourgeoisie, or else the united front with the revolutionary proletariat, they do not think for a moment but select the first alternative.

In his article Citizen Vandervelde explained the decision to postpone the final reply till November 14, when the E.C. was to meet together, by alleging that there was no hurry, and that "at the time when we received the Manifesto issued by the Comintern, Escer had already conquered in Barcelona, the general strike had already finished in Madrid and the provinces, while the uprising in Asturias had already been drowned in blood. In brief, 'order'—temporarily—had already been established in Spain"—And under such conditions the only question could be that of helping the victims, of bringing pressure to bear on the governments so that they should give the "right of asylum" to Spaniards, and of stirring public opinion against Lerroux, and for this, it was his view, it was possible to wait a month. But Citizen Vandervelde did not tell the truth. The appeal made by the Comintern was dated the 10th of October and the Bureau of the Second International received it on the 11th, whereas the capital of Asturias, Oviedo, was only occupied by troops on the 13th of October, after which the Red Army of the Asturian workers held up the columns of government troops in the mining valleys of Asturias for several weeks. And after the Asturian workers withdrew to the mountains with arms in their hands, the *Bandiera Rossa*, published by the Communists, wrote the following: "The beasts of the monarchist clerical fascist reaction have hastened to raise shouts of triumph. They have been too much in a hurry. . . . The counter-revolution has won a fight . . . but the fight continues; we are by no means defeated. In the ranks of the revolutionary party new sections of struggle are being set up throughout the whole

country, etc." That this is the state of things now in Spain is confirmed even by the organ of the Spanish monarchists.

Thus, Citizen Vandervelde washed his hands like Pontius Pilate, in the very heat of the struggle, when it was a question not only of assistance to the "victims" of the revolution, but primarily of support to the revolutionary fighters, by adopting a defeatist position. Citizen Vandervelde, ex-Minister of the Belgian Government during the war period, should know what name is given to the behavior of an individual who, after the first difficult clashes, considers the battle lost by the friendly (friendly is his word!) army, who considers that it has already been smashed up, that what we are faced with is only "tragedy" and that there are no more fighters but only victims. Or perhaps Citizen Vandervelde considers that the "Socialist" should display firmness in estimating the prospects of the war when it is being carried on by the bourgeoisie of his own country, but not at all when it is being carried on by the revolutionary proletariat? Apparently this is the case.

In his article, directly after speaking about assistance for the victims of the Spanish revolution, Citizen Vandervelde continues as follows in connection with the Manifesto of the Comintern:

"But this [*i.e.*, assistance to the Spanish workers—A.M.] summarily speaking, is only of second rate and practically of episodic interest in face of another problem which assumes ever-greater practical importance with every day that passes, namely, that of the restoration of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Social-Democratic Parties; the investigation into the possibilities of and conditions for constant cooperation between the Russian Revolution and the proletariat in the West-European countries."

Citizen Vandervelde is occupied more than anything else with the question of "constant cooperation with the Russian Revolution". We know that this question has always occupied his attention and we are also aware of the forms which this "cooperation" with the Russian Revolution has taken. This is clearly to be seen from materials printed in the current number of the journal *Historic Notes*.

"The cooperation" of Citizen Vandervelde with the Russian Revolution was expressed in the fact that in 1914 he called on the Russian Socialists to cease their struggle against tsarism and that in 1917 he called on the Russian workers and soldiers to carry on the imperialist war to a victorious conclusion, and that he took part in a Belgian government when it officially recognized a monarchist government organized by the counter-revolutionary General Kolchak.

"The cooperation" of Vandervelde was further expressed in the fact that he supported and continues to support Georgian counter-revolutionaries and that

he joined his voice to the lying campaign which directed the foul accusation against Lenin that he was allegedly a German agent, and by the fact that Vandervelde went to the defense of the S.R.'s who made an attempt to assassinate Lenin, and by the fact that Vandervelde was for a long time opposed to the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, etc.

Citizen Vandervelde, with the "sincerity" peculiar to him, greets the establishment of "cooperation between the Russian Revolution and the West-European proletariat", and states that a decision of this problem comes up against difficulties, for "it is difficult to understand how the Communist International fights along with us in France, Spain and other countries in defense of 'democratic liberties' while in the Soviet Union these liberties do not exist, and while they treat Socialists who are not Communists there as pariahs with whom no contact must be had". Corresponding to this he considers it "appropriate for the Socialist International to discuss with the Communist International the conditions and guarantees for a bona fide agreement which would be equally applicable to the countries where Social-Democracy is the dominant power, and to those countries—the U.S.S.R.—where they are outlaws, and where the time is more than ripe for the establishment of an atmosphere in which the non-Communist Socialists could breathe".

Citizen Vandervelde speculates on the urge of the working masses towards unity of action, and is trying to confuse them. He wishes to convince them that the conditions in the countries where the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie exists, whether this dictatorship is covered by parliamentarism or whether it is an open fascist dictatorship, are identical with the conditions in the country where the dictatorship of the proletariat exists. He wishes to convince them that the democratic rights for which the Communists fight in the capitalist countries, so as to *render it easier to organize the proletariat and lead it to the decisive battles for Soviet Power*, are identical with the "liberties" which the Mensheviks seek to achieve for themselves in the Soviet Union, so as to introduce demoralization into the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus to *prepare for the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!*

Mr. Vandervelde is wasting his efforts! The Russian workers feel themselves masters in their own country, they know that there is no country in the world where such proletarian democracy exists as in the Soviet Union, and they will decisively repulse anybody who dares in the Soviet Union to demand liberty for counter-revolutionary agitation, liberty for the Mensheviks, who fought during the Civil War on the side of the counter-revolution against the Soviet Government. And the workers in the capitalist countries are becoming more and more convinced

with every day that passes that what they need democratic liberties for is not to continue to live peacefully together with the bourgeoisie and to collaborate with them, as the Messrs. Vanderveldes do, but in order to wipe out all collaboration with the bourgeoisie and to advance to the storming of capitalism.

I conclude. Mr. Vandervelde and the Executive Committee of the Second International have become convinced that they are helpless to use their discipline to tie down those parties who have entered the path of united front action with the Communists. They have therefore withdrawn the embargo which prevented sections of the Second International from concluding agreements with the Communist Parties. But they hope to spoil the united front of struggle with the Communists by another means: they hope that they will succeed in giving the movement in

favor of the united front of struggle another direction, namely, that of conciliating Communism and Social-Democracy, and of diluting Communism in the collaborationist outlook of the Second International under the flag of the "unity of the working class".

Let them leave these hopes on one side. The united front of struggle of the Social-Democratic and Communist workers will grow and extend in spite of their opposition, but it will lead not to what they are dreaming about. It will lead to the majority of the working class in the capitalist countries breaking once and for all with those who collaborate with the capitalists, and entering on the struggle for the power of the proletariat, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and for Soviet Power, under the flag of Communism.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY AGAINST CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SIXTH DRIVE

By WAN MING

WHAT TACTICS MUST THE RED ARMY EMPLOY TO COUNTERACT THE NEW TACTICS OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK IN THE SIXTH DRIVE?

IT is known that in the Sixth Drive Chiang Kai-shek carried out what is known as the "new plan". In order to explain the progress of the struggle of the Red Army against Chiang Kai-shek in this drive and characterize the present situation in the Soviet Districts and of the Red Army, it is necessary to deal thoroughly with this "new plan" of Chiang Kai-shek.

In Chiang Kai-shek's own words, this new plan is a combination of the plan elaborated by General Von Seeckt* and the plan of Tsen Ko-fang.** The latter plan, as admitted by Chiang Kai-shek, Wan Tsing-Wei, and others, devotes "30 per cent to military operations and 70 per cent to political measures in the fight against the Red Army". But does this proportion (30 per cent and 70 per cent) mean that the military forces operating against the Red Army are smaller? No, this proportion signifies only that Chiang Kai-shek, in operating his "new plan", alongside with the military operations uses special political measures directed against the Red Army and against the Communist Party.

This so-called 70 per cent of the "new plan", i.e., the political measures, are being carried out primarily

under the slogan of a "Political Campaign Against Communism". With this aim in view, Chiang Kai-shek has first of all organized a special so-called "fascist" organization known as the Blue Blouse League; second, he has begun the establishment of political education departments in all military units and the staff of these departments is drawn from the ranks of the Blue Blouse League. These departments not only fulfill the role of political propagandists, but also of gendarmes, keeping the various military units under their constant control.

Third, Chiang Kai-shek is organizing on a broad scale Ming Tuan detachments (armed detachments of landlords) and punitive expeditions against the Communists in the countryside. He is also strengthening the system by which, for every member of a peasant family suspected of sympathizing with the "Red bandits", not only is the whole family held responsible, but so are a number of families united in the so-called "Tsia" and "Bao", as well.

Fourth, a series of demagogic decrees, as, for example, the decree regarding the "revival of agriculture and the reduction of taxes and levies", have been published and a campaign for "economic reconstruction of China", etc., has been initiated.

Fifth, Chiang Kai-shek has recently begun a very broad campaign under the slogan of "For a New Life in China". In practice, however, this has led to the revival of the old medieval feudalism and feudal morality in China, the strengthening of Confucianism, etc. But the most important of these so-called political measures initiated by Chiang Kai-

* The German General Von Seeckt is Chiang Kai-shek's chief of the General Staff.

** Tsen Ko-fang—the chief hangman of the Taiping revolution and the watchdog of the Tsing dynasty and of the imperialists.

shek is the strengthening of the terror in the major commercial and industrial centers against even the smallest signs of an anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement among the broad masses. This terror is especially directed against the vanguard of the toiling masses—the Communist Party. Here all means are being put into use, such as a vicious white terror, and the bribing of individual renegades from the revolution and from the Communist Party with the aim of disintegrating and shattering our Party organizations.

The second slogan in the "new plan" of Chiang Kai-shek is the so-called "*Economic Campaign Against Communism*". Under this slogan Chiang Kai-shek is conducting, in the first place, a complete economic blockade of the Soviet districts; second, he is carrying on a relentless destruction of agriculture, transport, and industry in Soviet China, by means of air-bombing of the Soviet districts and direct destruction of enterprises in places captured by his armies.

The third slogan is the so-called "*Transportation Campaign Against Communism*". Under this slogan Chiang Kai-shek is conducting: (1) the construction of new roads and railways around the central Soviet districts for facilitating the transportation of the white troops; (2) the destruction and burning of forests in the mountainous districts which served as hiding places for the Red partisan detachments and individual units of the Red Army.

Finally, the fourth slogan advanced by Chiang Kai-shek is the so-called "*Cultural Campaign Against Communism*". Under this slogan Chiang Kai-shek is burning all the revolutionary and Left literature. For example, in Shanghai alone, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the burning of 25,000 volumes of various books, beginning with Communist literature and ending with books of liberal-bourgeois content. Further, a "Campaign Against Communism in the Schools and Universities" is being conducted, accompanied by the use of gangster methods. Many students, writers, and journalists in Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, and other important cities, have been kidnapped by Blue Blouse gangs.

But the most important and chief part of Chiang Kai-shek's plan are the military operations against the Red Army. In the struggle against the Red Army of the Tsiansing Soviet District alone, Chiang Kai-shek has engaged between 65 and 70 divisions and eight separate brigades of regular troops; each division numbering 7,000 to 10,000 men. This is approximately two-thirds of the officially registered number of troops in the whole of China (there are 99 divisions in all) and almost all the troops at the disposal of Chiang Kai-shek. Besides this, 300 aeroplanes are taking part in the Sixth Campaign, of which 150 constantly patrol the front lines and bombard the positions of the Red Army.

The basic points in this "new plan" consist of the following:

1. From the tactics of a direct advance against the Red Army Chiang Kai-shek has gone over to the tactics of siege and starving the enemy into submission.

2. After a tactic of rapid raids and charges of his troops on Soviet territory, Chiang Kai-shek has now chosen the tactic of slow forward movements. Every day his troops advance a maximum of 5-6 li (1-2 miles) and after capturing a point, they immediately fortify and lay roads for automobile communication with the advancing men and with the hinterland.

3. Chiang Kai-shek, in contrast to his former tactics of operations of individual army divisions, is now operating a new tactic of operations by compact units of a larger scale consisting of from 6 to 10 or 12 army divisions in each operative group. Simultaneously Chiang Kai-shek is utilizing even to a greater extent his advantages over the Red Army in military technique, by developing the operations against the Red Army in the following order: first by attacks from the air, then bombardments by heavy artillery, and only after this preparation come the operations of the infantry.

These are the elements which constitute the basic content of Chiang Kai-shek's new military plan in the part elaborated by Von Seek. The other part of this plan—taken from Tsen Ko-fang—in its application during the Sixth Campaign meant the organization on a broad scale of irregular forces such as the Ming Tuan detachments and punitive expeditions against the Communists, these forces operating as auxiliary forces in the military operations of the regular army. All this is based on experiences of Tsen Ko-fang in his struggle to crush the Taiping revolution. Chiang Kai-shek further copies Tsen Ko-fang and attempts to organize the whole population on the basis of collective responsibility, a principle which has been explained above.

The basic aim of this "new plan" is *gradually to surround our Soviet districts from all sides and drive the Red Army out of the large territory it occupies.* He attempts to corner the Red Army, *bombarding it both from the air and with heavy artillery, attack it with poison gas and thus destroy its basic forces.*

The working out of this plan confronts the Red Army with a number of serious difficulties. First, the absence of modern military technique, i.e., aviation and heavy artillery, makes it difficult for the Red Army to conduct trench warfare against Chiang Kai-shek's troops. This also makes it difficult to break through Chiang Kai-shek's front, which is heavily entrenched and fortified. This factor considerably increases the difficulties of rapidly liquidating Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the major fronts.

Second, another difficulty is that the old and the

previously very effective tactics of the Red Army are now less effective. Before, our tactics in the main consisted of the following: (1) In maneuvering the Nanking forces into the depth of the Soviet districts and, with the help of mass guerilla warfare and the assistance of the toiling masses of the Soviet territory, destroying the enemy; (2) In delivering blows against the individual and comparatively weak sections of Chiang Kai-shek's front and by developing our success in these sections, breaking through the fortified sections of the front. According to the "new plan" Chiang Kai-shek forbids his troops to penetrate rapidly into Soviet territory, and to pursue the Red Army. All attempts are made to strengthen the front by the movement of strong army forces. Thus the effectiveness of our forces and of our old tactics is lessened.

Third, the difficulties for the Red Army arise also from the operations of Chiang Kai-shek's compact large-scale military units and the close connection between the enemy's front and hinterland. The strict military control over the soldiers and officers, and the growing terror against all "rebels", have made it considerably more difficult to capture military supplies and arms from Chiang Kai-shek's army and have made it more difficult for the units of his army to come over to the side of the Red Army.

Fourth, in connection with the increased aerial and artillery bombardment, it has become more difficult for the Red Army to defend the Soviet territories and it sometimes becomes necessary to abandon certain cities in our old territories.

Thus, the resistance to the "new plan" of Chiang Kai-shek is accompanied by great difficulties. But if one were to ask, has the Red Army the possibility of withstanding this new military tactic of Chiang Kai-shek?—We would answer: *Yes, there is such a possibility.* Generally speaking, at the present moment Chiang Kai-shek is in a position to enforce his plan, first of all, because the Soviet Revolution in China up till now is suffering from the unevenness of its development. This unevenness means that the military struggle between revolution and counter-revolution is developing only in certain sections of the vast territory of China, and this in turn makes it possible for Chiang Kai-shek to concentrate all his military forces on the task of surrounding the central Soviet districts. If important revolutionary battles were developed on a bigger scale, especially in the big cities or in the vital points of Chiang Kai-shek's hinterland (for example, uprisings or large-scale armed actions of the workers, peasants and soldiers) then the "new plan" would very rapidly lose its value.

Further, Chiang Kai-shek is in a position to enforce his plan also because the Red Army is not yet in possession of sufficient military technique—aviation and heavy artillery, otherwise the Red Army would have defeated the Sixth Campaign long ago, as was

the case with the previous Kuomintang campaigns. But such is only the general aspect of the problem. Concretely, however, the problem is, can or cannot the Red Army break the enforcement of Chiang Kai-shek's "new plan" under the existing conditions, *i.e.*, notwithstanding the temporary hindrance in the development of major revolutionary battles in the large cities, and vital points in Chiang Kai-shek's rear and with insufficient military technique? We have already replied by pointing out that such a possibility exists, and this is confirmed by further analysis of the progress of our struggle against the Kuomintang's Sixth Campaign.

THE FOUR STAGES IN THE STRUGGLE OF THE RED ARMY AGAINST THE SIXTH CAMPAIGN

The First Stage. The first stage began approximately in September-October 1933 and lasted till the beginning of the Fukien events in December 1933. This stage is characterized by the victory of the Red Army over Chiang Kai-shek's troops in the Northern Front of Fukien and the Eastern Front of Kiangsi. In this stage the Red Army in the course of August and September 1933 succeeded in successfully resisting the enemy's attack. The Red Army destroyed four of the six basic divisions of the 19th Army and as a result of this victory it occupied the important strategic point and large city of Yenping in Northern Fukien and the county center, Sha-Hsien. Using these two points as a base the Red Army threatened not only Foochow, but the entire Chiang Kai-shek's Western and Northern fronts in Kiangsi. This victory of the Red Army in Fukien compelled Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his military plans and commence preparations for a new offensive.

The Second Stage. The Fukien events, that is, the open action of the 19th Army against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan, and the establishment of the so-called "People's" government in Foochow independent of Nanking, were the opening events of the second stage in the struggle of the Red Army against the Sixth Drive. The most characteristic feature of this second stage is the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to transfer his forces engaged against the Red Army to Fukien against the 19th Army. The result of this was not only a temporary and partial weakening of his position on the Northern front in Kiangsi, but also a halting of Chiang Kai-shek's basic military operation.

In the second stage the Red Army was confronted with a most favorable situation. A situation was created in which it was possible to combine the struggle of the Red Army and of the partisan troops within the territory of the central Soviet district with the operations of the irregular troops and Red Army detachments outside the central Soviet district. It was also possible to coordinate the struggle with the armed sections of the 19th Army against Chiang

Kai-shek. But the Fukien events lasted only for a short while—one month or six weeks—and the Communist Party lost the opportune moment due to mistakes committed both by us and on the part of the 19th Army, the details of which are given below.

The Third Stage. The defeat suffered by the 19th Army in Fukien at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek signifies the beginning of the third stage—lasting approximately from February to the first days of August 1934. This third stage is characterized by desperate battles between the basic forces of the Red Army in the central Soviet districts and the main forces of Chiang Kai-shek. This has been the most difficult stage in the struggle of the Red Army against the Sixth Campaign.

It was only at this stage that Chiang Kai-shek actually received the possibility of putting into effect, step by step, his new military plan, inasmuch as his victory over the 19th Army opened up to him the whole province of Fukien. The capture of this province meant that Chiang Kai-shek became master of the Eastern front and thus compelled the Red Army to take the offensive on two fronts, viz., in the North and in the East. He also temporarily forced the other militarists who previously took a more or less passive attitude with regard to military operations, to activate their operations against the Red Army.

Meanwhile, the central Soviet district was literally besieged from all sides—from the North, East, West and partly from the South. The Red Army and irregular troops adopted the tactic of defending the Soviet district mainly from within. Certainly this does not mean that in this third stage there were no individual and partial victories won by the Red Army. The Red Army scored even very considerable victories. The following is a very incomplete list of the victories of the Red Army during this period.

On February 16, 1934, in the battles in the vicinity of Lidiao and Funkuanshang (Nan-feng county) the Red Army destroyed the 79th and 67th Divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

On March 15, as a result of a battle in San Si-tsi and Wan-du, four regiments of the enemy were crushed.

On March 23-25, in the battles near Chang Sing-chau, a whole brigade was crushed as well as the regiment of General Tang, and 186 rifles, 17 machine-guns, 4 artillery guns, over 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 bombs, etc., were captured.

On April 18, in the battle in Yunan county, the 52nd Division of Chiang Kai-shek was destroyed; 1,000 prisoners, over 1,000 rifles, 10 machine-guns, 7 artillery guns, 3 field-radio stations, etc., were captured by the Red Army.

On April 11-18, in the battles in Kanchow county, the 11th Division, one of the six sent here, was destroyed and hundreds of rifles, 8 machine-guns, and about 30,000 rounds of ammunition were captured.

From April 26 to May 19, during the battles in Tsianlin county, two detachments under the command of Generals Chow and Tang were destroyed and 214 rifles, 8 machine-guns, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition were captured.

On May 27, in the battle of Mainin (Sha-Hsien county) two battalions of the 19th Division were destroyed, over 300 prisoners, 300 rifles, 4 machine-guns, and about 100,000 rounds of ammunition captured.

On May 29, in the battles of Huyun, one brigade of the 80th Division was crushed, 1,420 prisoners, 910 rifles, 42 machine-guns, and 3 artillery guns were captured.

On June 8 in the battle of Lunhan in Yunfeng county, the 91st Division of the enemy suffered defeat after a severe battle with the Red Army and lost over 400 men taken prisoners, 350 rifles, 11 machine-guns, etc.

In June and July of this year in the battles around Kanchow and Tsianin, the Red Army delivered a heavy blow against Chiang Kai-shek's advancing divisions.

If we were to sum up the general results of the struggle of Chiang Kai-shek during the Sixth Drive for last year, we will find that according to data of the enemy's own staff the losses suffered by Chiang Kai-shek amounted to 40,000-50,000 killed, 12,000-15,000 prisoners and about 40,000 wounded. But if we take into account that the serious battles on the Northern front began only in the third stage, then it is clear that in view of the particularly severe offensive conducted by Chiang Kai-shek the victories of the Red Army were significant. However, notwithstanding this, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in reinforcing his units by transferring troops from other provinces or by forming new detachments of his mercenary army.

Further, owing to the military-technical weakness of the Red Army, it failed to break through the four or five sections of the enemy's front and, as a result of this, did not succeed in destroying the basic military force of the enemy in the major sections of the Northern front and thus finally defeat the Sixth Campaign. In addition to this, Chiang Kai-shek, thanks to his advantages in military technique, succeeded in this historic stage in forcing the Red Army to retreat from several county centers (Kanchow, Tsianlin, Tailin, and others).

Since the end of July and the beginning of August, 1934, the Communist Party of China and the commanding staff of the Red Army have decided to adopt a military tactic which is more in accord with the present military situation. The basic point in this tactic consists in maintaining and consolidating the increasing forces of the Red Army. One of the results of the application of this new tactic by the 8th and 9th Red Army Corps in the beginning of August was

the break in the enemy's front in Fukien and a rapid advance through the southern part of Fukien province towards the provincial center, Foochow.

In the progress of its advance the 7th Army Corps scored a number of victories and destroyed one division of the enemy's troops, captured the cities of Sha-hsien, Yutsi, Shuikow, etc., and captured a large amount of ammunition, food, etc. Among the military trophies were 23 motor lorries which the 7th Red Army Corps used for a more rapid advance on Foochow. Later, this corps marched to the northeast and united with the partisan troops. After capturing the city of Funing, the combined force advanced further through Shonin and Chenhe and approached the boundaries of the three provinces—Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi.

Thus, the 7th Red Army Corps created a new front in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, i.e., together with the irregular forces it established new Soviet and guerilla warfare districts in the junction of the above-mentioned three provinces. In addition to this, according to recent information, the 7th Army Corps has probably joined the 10th Red Army Corps on the boundaries of Kiangsi-Anhwei-Fukien and, together with the 10th Red Army Corps, has created a new front in the hinterland and on the flanks of Chiang Kai-shek's army, and thus threatens not only the basic points behind the lines of Chiang Kai-shek's Northern and Eastern fronts, but also the chief basis of Chiang Kai-shek's army in Chekiang province.

All of this undoubtedly makes it easier for the Red Army and irregular partisan troops to conduct military operations in the central Soviet districts. Thus the 7th Red Army Corps is courageously fulfilling the task set before it by the Soviet government and the revolutionary military council. The 7th Corps under the command of Comrade Lo Ping Hwei is one of the best fighting detachments of the heroic workers' and peasants' Red Army of Soviet China. It is today advancing as the vanguard of the anti-Japanese, national-revolutionary war (its fighting banners bear the inscription: "Anti-Japanese Vanguard of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China"), and is successfully marching from Central Kiangsi to Fukien-Chekiang. The 9th Red Army Corps, after its successful operations in connection with the 7th Corps, is now engaged in active operations in Fukien Province.

The second result of the application of the new tactic was the fact that the main forces of the 6th Red Army under the command of Comrade Hsiao Ke, after leaving the former Soviet districts through the fortified points on the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi, have successfully marched through the entire eastern and southern part of Hunan Province, occupying the cities of Shuchen, Kweitung, Kwei-yang, Sintian, and Tuo-hsien. After this the 6th Army

approached the borders of Kwangsi and captured the city of Chuao-in-chuo, and later, moving northward, penetrated into the province of Kweichow and established contact with the 2nd Red Army commanded by Comrade Ho Lun. According to information published some weeks ago, the 6th Army has not only succeeded in establishing contact with the 2nd Army of Ho Lun, but is advancing further towards Szechuan and, together with the advancing sections of the victorious 4th Red Army, is threatening Chuntain.

This operation creates certain prerequisites for the establishment of territorial and military contact between the Soviet districts and districts of guerilla warfare in the provinces of Szechuan, Kweichow, Hunan, and Kiangsi. Thanks to this, the Red Army and the irregular partisan troops can now develop guerilla warfare and maneuvers on the flanks and behind the lines of Chiang Kai-shek's army.

The fourth stage. Thus, since the introduction of the new tactics, viz., from the moment of the successful operation of the 7th Red Army corps in the East and Northeast and the 6th Red Army in the West and Northwest, the struggle of the Red Army against the Sixth Drive in the central Soviet district of Kiangsi has developed into its fourth stage. The new tactic of the Red Army is by no means confined to the advance operations of the 7th corps and 6th Army. The advance of those two units constitutes only the *beginning* of the application of the new tactic; this is only a part of the new tactic.

But even this beginning, these partial operations, and application of the new tactic, i.e., the advance of the 7th Red Army corps and the 6th Red Army, have already changed the situation as follows:

1. The military operations of the Red Army and irregular partisan troops within the boundary of the central Soviet district are more coordinated with the operations of all sections of the Red Army and irregular partisan troops in the districts surrounding the central Soviet district.

2. The forces and activities of the Red Army and irregular troops in the central Soviet districts and in the outlying sections are coordinated with the forces and operations of the large units of the Red Army and with the irregular partisan troops, in localities formerly disconnected with the central Soviet districts with the aim of a joint successful struggle.

3. In the flanks and behind the lines of the enemy's army new auxiliary fronts are being created which facilitate the defensive struggle in the central Soviet district and complicate the military operations of Chiang Kai-shek.

4. The Red Army is gradually taking from Chiang Kai-shek's troops the initiative in military operations. In Kiangsi-Fukien-Hunan it is already beginning to go over from defensive to the offensive and to the counter-offensive.

5. The operation of the plan elaborated by Von

Seekt and Chiang Kai-shek, aimed at surrounding the Red Army from all sides and ultimately destroying the Red Army, is now being broken.

6. The forces of the Red Army and of the irregular partisan troops are rapidly growing; the system of supplies, both of ammunition and of food, is improving and new Soviet and partisan warfare districts are being created.

In connection with the change of our military tactic Chiang Kai-shek is also effecting changes in his tactics. Instead of the concentration of his main forces on the Northern front of Kiangsi he is now attempting to deliver the main blow against the Red Army from the East. Instead of a slow and gradual advance of his troops into the heart of the central Soviet district, Chiang Kai-shek intends to capture quickly the Red cities of Shichan, Ting Chow and Suikin. This is obvious from the recent broad offensive of Chiang Kai-shek which commenced on September 26 and is directed on Shichen and Ting Chow. Over fourteen divisions and strong aviation groups for bombarding the cities are participating in this operation.

These changes in the enemy's tactic are a result of the following: (1) Chiang Kai-shek recognized that with the new tactic of the Red Army his plan of surrounding and blockading the Soviet districts is rapidly losing its effectiveness. He is now attempting by means of a new and rapid offensive against the Soviet basis to destroy the man-power of the Red Army; (2) Chiang Kai-shek is afraid that other sections of the Red Army will advance from the central Soviet district into Fukien-Chekiang, that is, into his main military and financial base; (3) Chiang Kai-shek wishes to achieve at least some small victory in the central Soviet district by the eve of the 5th Kuomintang Congress, (the opening of the Congress is scheduled for the middle of November) in order to save his prestige in the struggle against the Reds. He wants to use this victory against his enemies (primarily the Guandung group led by Chen Tsi-Tang, Li Tsun-chen and Hu Han-ming) by threatening them with the use of armed force. Further, it is the intention of Chiang Kai-shek at the Congress itself to put through his plan of purging the leading party and government organs of the Kuomintang and substituting all the oppositional elements with people loyal to him.

Under these conditions it is clear that the Red Army must even more systematically carry out its new tactic in order to stop any possibility of a destruction of its basic forces. It must not succumb to the provocation of the enemy and must fight concretely for the preparation of all necessary prerequisites for the decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek.

In the light of these tactics of both armies, the possible capture by Chiang Kai-shek's troops of a few more Soviet cities even in the main Soviet base,

the central Soviet district, cannot become a factor deciding the result of the struggle between the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek in the Sixth Drive.

The position of the Red Army and of the Soviets at present, in the fourth stage of the struggle, is considerably better than in the third stage, inasmuch as the plan of General Von Seekt to surround the Red Army has proved unsuccessful, the strength of the Red Army is growing, military operations of the Red Army and of the irregular troops are more successfully co-ordinated, and, finally, the situation is considerably improved from the point of view of the immediate perspective of the development of the Soviet Revolution in China.

WHAT IS THE EXPLANATION OF THE DRAWN-OUT CHARACTER OF THE STRUGGLE?

The basic reason for the drawn-out character of the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and the Red Army in the Sixth Drive is the aid of the imperialists, first of all of the Japanese, to the Nanking clique. This aid was paid for with *open treachery and capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek to Japanese imperialism.*

Last year, and particularly from the moment the Tangu Armistice was signed, Chiang Kai-shek has gone over from masked capitulation to Japanese imperialism to a policy of open capitulation. On the basis of this armistice, Chiang Kai-shek has agreed: (1) to the actual recognition of Manchukuo; (2) to so-called economic collaboration of China, Japan and Manchukuo; (3) to actual transfer to the direct military control of Japan of the five Northern provinces of China; (4) Open and relentless suppression of all anti-Japanese mass movements, including the boycott of Japanese goods in central China, and, together with Japan, the conducting of a joint struggle against anti-Japanese volunteers and partisans in Jehol, north China and Manchuria; (5) Mutual aid in suppressing "disorder", i.e., the revolutionary movement of the masses in China, Manchukuo and Japan.

In one form or another all of these points of the Tangu agreement are being enforced. For example, the establishment of a so-called de-militarized zone, giving Japan actual control over Peiping and Tientsin, for preparations of a military *place d'armes* and the revival of direct post and railway connections between North China and Mukden. The open propaganda in Chiang Kai-shek's press of the hopelessness of attempts to return Manchuria and Jehol to China, the relentless struggle against the anti-Japanese national revolutionary movement, primarily directed against the Communist Party and the Red Army, the publication by the Nanking Government of a decree reducing the tariff on Japanese goods imported into China, etc., are only some of the measures put into operation.

All of these measures, it is true, have led to a further exposure of Chiang Kai-shek as one who has betrayed the interests of the Chinese people. But it is precisely by paying the price of this treachery that Chiang Kai-shek has been able to gain the aid of Japan, expressed in the temporary and partial consolidation of his military positions.

The following facts prove this:

1. Chiang Kai-shek, with the help of Japan, has succeeded in shifting considerable military forces of Chang Hseuh-liang from Hopei Province to the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan. This gave Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of transferring his forces from these provinces to the Tiang-sing front against the Red Army.

2. The Northern military groups, confronted with the immediate danger of military control by Japan, were forced temporarily to discontinue their open struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. This resulted in a definite improvement behind the lines of Chiang Kai-shek's armies in the North where formerly considerable detachments of his army were used to guard the movements of the Northern militarists.

3. With the direct aid of the Japanese armies Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in quickly liquidating the anti-government and anti-Japanese military operations of the armies of Chi-Hun-Chang, Fang Chen-Wu, Sung Tien-Ying and Feng Yu-Hsiang, and thus temporarily crushing the anti-Chiang Kai-shek actions in North China.

4. With the military and moral support of Japan Chiang Kai-shek was victorious in his struggles against the 19th Army and in this way to a considerable extent he temporarily stopped the possibility of anti-Chiang Kai-shek actions by the Canton and other groups. It is precisely for this reason that Chiang Kai-shek in the Sixth Drive was able to concentrate nearly two-thirds of all the military forces of China and almost all of his own forces in Kiangsi for operations against the central Soviet district.

Finally, whereas in the previous five drives Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed the support mainly of American, German and other imperialists, in the present drive, besides considerable aid from American, German and Italian imperialists, Chiang Kai-shek is receiving enormous military and financial support from Japanese imperialism, which is in a position to render this support quicker than the other powers. This enormous support of Japanese imperialism is one of the basic reasons explaining the drawn-out character of the Sixth Drive.

The third basic reason is not only the considerable superiority of Chiang Kai-shek's military forces and military technique over the Red Army and the adoption of his "new plan", but the mistakes and weaknesses in the work of the Chinese Communist Party.

The leadership of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese Red Army have already some time

ago recognized the serious mistake committed by them in the course of the military operations during the Fukien events. The fact of the matter is that the Party leadership of the C.P. of China, as well as the commanding staff of the 19th Army, underestimated the serious political and military strategic significance of the Northeastern front of Kiangsi-Fukien. The leadership of the Communist Party as well as the commanding staff of the 19th Army were expecting serious battles between Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the 19th Army on the Chekiang front.

For this reason, instead of taking measures to defend the Northeastern front along the line of Kiangsi-Fukien with all the forces at their disposal and thus hold back and hinder the advance of Chiang's troops through this short cut in the direction of Yen-Ping and Foochow, the commanding staff of the Red Army transferred its forces from this front to the Northern front in Kiangsi to the fortified points around Foochow and even tried to move their forces through the Kan river in order to attack Chiang Kai-shek from the rear. This weakening of the Red Army forces on an extremely important section at the front supplied Chiang Kai-shek with the possibility of rapidly advancing in this direction. Chiang Kai-shek with the help of his vassals, general Lu-Ho-din and others, who temporarily went over to the side of the Fukien government, lost no time in occupying Yen-Ping. In doing so Chiang Kai-shek threatened on the one hand the 19th Army, operating behind his lines, and on the other hand the detachments of the 19th Army defending Foochow. This danger gave rise to panic on all sections of the front occupied by the 19th Army, and the Red Army was no longer in a position to render military aid to the 19th Army.

It is precisely this mistake of the commanding staff of the Red Army, together with the errors and weaknesses of the 19th Army, which played a very important role in hastening the defeat of the 19th Army. This defeat first of all created additional difficulties in the struggle of the Red Army against Chiang Kai-shek. The result of the Fukien events would be absolutely different were it not for this mistake on our part, and for the weaknesses of the 19th Army. The successful advance of the detachments of the 19th Army on Chekiang and the simultaneous development of military operations by the Red Army in the Northwestern front of Kiangsi-Fukien would have placed Chiang Kai-shek in a most difficult position.

Moreover, the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek's front in Chekiang or in the Northeast of Kiangsi-Fukien would have signified a break of his entire front. If this would have been followed by a further development of the Fukien events the situation in China would have been different from what it is

at present, since the first important successes resulting from the joint operations of the 19th and Red Armies against Chiang Kai-shek would have led inevitably to a broad development of the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek revolutionary upsurge of the broad masses of people. It would have also led to the consolidation of the open anti-Chiang Kai-shek armed actions by the various militaristic cliques and even by the wavering detachments of Chiang's own army. Even one or two months after the defeat of the 19th Army the anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese military operations of the Chi Hung-Chang, Fang Chen-Wu, Feng Yu-Hsiang, Sun Dsiang-in armies in North China still continued. If the Fukien events had continued to develop up till that time, then the position of these armies as well as the position of the 19th Army would be much different from what it is today.

We must not conceal the mistakes of the Communist Party during the Fukien events. The strength of a Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that, in contradistinction to all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, it never hides its mistakes and weaknesses but boldly exposes them and openly criticizes them. It does so in order to overcome them and to avoid their repetition in the future, and on the basis of its own experiences it learns how to defeat the enemy.

Among the mistakes and shortcomings in the activities of the Communist Party of China which led to the drawn-out character of the Sixth Drive (I am referring to our mistakes and shortcomings in the anti-imperialist working class and peasant movements in the non-Soviet districts in general) is the *impermissible ignoring by our Party organizations of the necessity of working among the troops of the militarists, especially under the present conditions of China, i.e., under conditions of revolution, war and intervention, and particularly under the circumstances of the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's Sixth Drive. In this situation the work of the Communist Party among the enemy's troops is of first rate and decisive importance.*

All of these mistakes and shortcomings in our activities have, more or less, one common source: this is the lack of understanding of the new factors which the Party must especially take into account in the organization of its work among the enemy's troops and in utilizing the contradictions in the camp of the militarists. These new factors can in the main be described as follows:

1. In connection with the unprecedented national crisis and the growing national revolutionary upsurge of the broadest masses of the people, numerous military forces of the militarists were in favor of a holy war of defense of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism.

2. The Red Army during the last years has grown

to be a *mighty military factor throughout China*. Only the Red Army came out from the very beginning of the Manchurian events, September 19, 1931, under the slogan of a "national-revolutionary war of the armed people against Japanese imperialism, in defense of the integrity, independence and unification of China". Out of all the anti-Chiang Kai-shek military forces only the Red Army is in a position to resist successfully the continuous colossal military campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek and to conduct a war against him, as against the chief betrayer of the national interests. Because of this, all the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek political and military groups cannot help but consider the Red Army a major military factor in the armed struggle against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, irrespective of whether their activities are based upon patriotic motives or upon the interests of the national-liberation movement or whether they are simply against Chiang Kai-shek as a result of their imperialist and militarist contradictions.

3. The practical experience of China for the last years shows that the organization and conduct of a national-revolutionary war by the armed people against Japanese and other imperialists are not only possible, but inevitable. In this war not only the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and all the revolutionary-minded toilers will participate, but also various political and military groups as well, although the latter are only temporary and unstable participants in this war.

Considering these new factors the problems of the activities of the Party among the troops of the enemy and of the utilization by the Party of the contradictions between the militarists, present themselves in a new form.

Under the present conditions in China the Communist Party has the possibility of winning over not only the soldier masses of the enemy's armies, but also to a considerable extent the non-commissioned and lower ranks of the officers on the basis of the slogan of armed defense of the fatherland, on the basis of the program of national and social liberation of China. Moreover, under certain conditions it is possible that individual officers of high rank will give in to the revolutionary pressure of their armies and of the masses of the people and will come out in favor of open military action against Japanese imperialism. In such a case these generals cannot help but allow the Communist Party and the revolutionary mass organizations in their territory the freedom of propaganda and of action. This would mean a favorable situation for us, a situation which gives our Party the possibility of winning over not only considerable sections, but even entire army corps and armies of the enemy to the side of the revolution. Last but not least the Communist Party in its work among the enemy's troops

sets before itself the task not so much of disintegrating these armies, but of winning them over for revolutionary struggle for saving the fatherland.

The new tactic in the problem of the Communist Party utilizing the contradictions between the military cliques consists first of all in that any conflict or antagonism between the various militarists must be utilized by the Party first of all in the interests of the armed struggle of the Red Army. Further, in the present situation in China, the chief enemy of the Chinese people and of its Red Army is Chiang Kai-shek. Every victory of Chiang Kai-shek over any opposing force is simultaneously a strengthening of Chiang's forces against the Red Army. At the same time, every victory of Chiang Kai-shek over the Red Army simultaneously signifies the consolidation of his positions against his opponents in the militarist camp. Therefore, the commanding staff of the Red Army must utilize the contradictions among the militarists, first of all aiming at weakening the military might of Chiang Kai-shek, who is our main enemy.

Basing itself upon this the commanding staff of the Red Army must not only not turn down any proposals of a military agreement against the common enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, with any anti-Chiang Kai-shek group, but it must by all means activate its own activities in this direction. If the war between Chiang Kai-shek and any of his opponents actually begins, the commanding staff of the Red Army must activate to a maximum its military operations on the corresponding front, independent of the existence or non-existence of a military agreement between the Red Army and the given opponent of Chiang Kai-shek. In addition to this, under present conditions in China, any serious anti-Japanese military action is inevitably transformed into struggle against Chiang Kai-shek just as every big anti-Chiang Kai-shek armed action must grow over into an open war against Japan. Therefore, the C.P. of China must not simply passively watch military operations between Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek forces, but must try to transform these operations of Chiang Kai-shek enemies, in one form or another, into a composite part of the national-liberation struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese slave-drivers and their hirelings—the Chiang Kai-shek clique.

Finally, one of the major reasons explaining the drawn-out character of the armed struggle between revolution and counter-revolution in China in general and of the struggle of the Red Army against the Sixth Drive in particular, is the weakness and the almost complete absence of real, direct aid on the part of the proletariat and of our fraternal Parties in the imperialist countries. The international imperialists are the main enemies of the Chinese Revolution and the organizers of Chiang Kai-shek's continuous anti-Soviet military campaigns. It is therefore clear

that effective and direct support of the struggle of the Chinese Red Army and of the Soviets on the part of the proletariat and of our fraternal Parties in the leading capitalist countries is of first rate importance.

If the American, Japanese, British, German, Italian and French workers came out under the banner of the united front of the working class and by means of a serious mass struggle (strikes, demonstrations, etc.) would compel the imperialist governments to stop their issuing of military and "non-military" loans to the Chinese militarists, if they would compel the imperialists to recall their military advisers and specialists from China, if the workers would succeed in stopping the transport of ammunition, poison gas, and airplanes to China, then the Sixth Drive would undoubtedly have long been ended by a complete victory over Chiang Kai-shek. However, up till now all of this remains only good intentions on the part of our fraternal Parties. And it is precisely in this, i.e., in the support by the imperialists, that Chiang Kai-shek draws his main support.

On this question the Communist Party of China and the Red Army have on more than one occasion approached their class brothers. They asked that the fraternal Communist Parties in the first place impress upon the minds of the workers that the struggle against the imperialists carried on by the Chinese Red Army under the leadership of the Communist Party is an integral part of their own everyday struggle with their employers. Our fraternal Parties in the capitalist countries must explain to the masses that the victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie can be achieved only under the condition that alongside of the militant united front of the working class there will be established militant unity of the proletariat and of its allies, i.e., the unity of the toilers of the capitalist countries with the toilers of the colonies and semi-colonies. The proletariat of the imperialist countries must realize that in rendering direct support to the Chinese Red Army it is thus helping its own struggle against imperialist war, fascism and capitalist exploitation. We not only hope, we are convinced that the proletariat and suppressed peoples of all countries will in the future show in practice the significance of real revolutionary international solidarity by supporting the heroic struggle of the Chinese Red Army and of the Chinese Soviets.

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN CHINA

The Immediate Perspectives of the Soviet Revolution:

I shall enumerate the concrete facts characterizing the general situation in China, first of all in the Soviet districts, without going into a detailed analysis of these facts. The main decisive factor characterizing the situation in Soviet China is the strength of

the armies of both sides as a result of a year's struggle between the Red Army and the enemy. According to incomplete information the situation presents itself as follows:

1. *Position of the Armies:* Growth of the Red Army from October 1933 to October 1934:

(a) In the central Soviet district—50-60 per cent (for example, only in May-June of this year there has been an increase of 62,000).

(b) In Szechuan—Shensi Soviet district—900-1,000 per cent (the Fourth Red Army has grown in one year from 15,000 to 140-150,000 men).

(c) In the district of the Second Red Army—80 per cent.

(d) In the district of the Tenth Army Corps—50 per cent.

(e) In the district of the 16th Red Army Corps—50 per cent.

(f) In the Hopei-Hunan-Anhwei Soviet district—80 per cent.

The Enemy's Losses:

(a) In the battles in the central Soviet district—over 100,000 men, including 40-45,000 killed, 12-15,000 prisoners and 40-45,000 wounded.

(b) All the troops of the Szechuan militarists, numbering about 30-35 divisions, were defeated in operations against the Red Army and in September-October lost about 70,000 killed.

(c) About ten divisions were crushed during the battles.

(d) Eight divisions partly defeated.

(e) There is as yet no information about the losses of Chiang Kai-shek in the territory of the 16th Red Army Corps.

Ten divisions have suffered partial defeat.

At the same time there is a constant and colossal growth of the irregular partisan forces, i.e., of the Red Guard, the Young Guard and local partisan warfare detachments. At the end of last year these forces numbered some 600-800,000 men.

2. *Growth of Soviet Territory.* Although there is as yet no exact data the available figures present the situation as follows: The districts occupied by the Red Army in various provinces constitute a territory twice the size of the territory lost by the Red Army in Kiangsi and Fukien (in the central, North-eastern and West Kiangsi districts, the Red Army lost 15-20 county seats). Among the newly captured districts are: 15-20 counties in Szechuan and Shensi occupied by the Fourth Army; about ten new counties occupied by the Second Army in Hupeh, Hunan and Kweichow; the Sixth Army has occupied several counties in Hunan and Kweichow; the Seventh Army Corps has occupied several districts in Fukien and Chekiang, etc. Besides this, in enumerating the territorial losses of the Red Army, it must be borne in mind that only the county seats have been lost and the majority of villages still remain in the hands of

the Red Army or the Red irregular partisan troops.

However, notwithstanding the fact that the new territories occupied by the Red Army are larger than the losses, we must acknowledge the fact that the partial losses in territory in the Kiangsi and Fukien Soviet districts are a great loss for the Red Army and for the Soviets. This is so inasmuch as many of the lost counties served as our territorial basis in the course of the last two years. It was in these counties that we developed Soviet construction, it was here that we built up our economy. In these territories there remain our toiling brothers and sisters who in the course of years heroically fought side by side with the Red Army and with our Party against Chiang Kai-shek and imperialism. After the capture of these bases by the white troops the medieval feudal regime has been revived, landlord property has been returned, the toiling masses have been reduced to conditions of slavery, and white terror rages.

At the same time, it is essential to emphasize that the partial loss of the old territories cannot play a decisive role in the outcome of the struggle of the Red Army against Chiang Kai-shek. By maintaining and increasing the man-power of the Red Army, these partial losses of old territory can be rapidly made up by the occupation of new districts and after a certain time, as a result of our political and military preparations, the newly occupied districts can become new bases of the Red Army and of the Soviets.

Therefore, it is necessary to carry on the fight on two fronts against the wrong conception on the part of individual Communists of the significance of temporary and partial territorial losses of the Red Army. We must also combat those who, basing themselves upon these losses, come to an absolutely unfounded conclusion of the defeat of the Chinese Soviet Revolution. Such a conclusion is not in accordance with the actual facts. It completely distorts the absolutely correct and flexible tactical conception of the Red Army which the Communist Party and the military revolutionary council is applying and will continue to apply. Such a conclusion spreads pessimism and panic in our ranks and misrepresents the actual situation and the perspectives of the Soviet Revolution in China. On the other hand, we must combat those who completely deny our difficulties in the struggle, those who lightly heartedly pass over our territorial losses, not understanding the significance of the loss of old territorial bases of the revolution.

3. *The Attitude of the Masses Towards the Red Army and Towards the White Troops.* The masses of the people in all Soviet districts are rendering all possible moral and material aid to the Red Army. This aid takes on the form of support for the families of Red Army soldiers and of the Red commanders, and ends with direct participation of women and children in the battles of the Red Army. The per-

sonnel of the Red Army is constantly being reinforced by new recruits. As a proof of this, let us take the fact that in the former bases of the 4th Army (now occupied by the 25th and 28th Red Army Corps), from the moment of its evacuation in September-October 1933, alongside with a furious white terror, the Kuomintang has engaged in numerous political maneuvers aiming at winning over the masses from the influence of the Red Army and of the Soviets. As a result of this, the Kuomintang press was forced to recognize openly the failure of its policy in these districts. The 25th and 28th Red Army Corps, that were temporarily defeated by the white troops, have succeeded in the last five or six months in considerably increasing their strength and achieving important successes, thanks to the unlimited support and sympathy of the masses of people in these districts.

4. *The Situation in Kuomintang China* is also a proof of the further growth of the revolutionary movement. The anti-imperialist struggles, and first of all the anti-Japanese movement, are more and more mobilizing the broad masses. It is sufficient to take only one well-known fact, *viz.*, the publication of the "general platform of organization of a national defensive war of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism". This document was signed by many, the first of which is the signature of Soong Chin-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. In this document Soong Chin-ling and the other signatories openly emphasize the hopelessness and harmfulness of the illusions about the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek's resistance to Japan, or of the possibility of American imperialism and the League of Nations coming to the aid of the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese enslavement. Simultaneously, the signatories of this document call upon the Chinese people to take a decisive stand and follow the only correct road of salvation of the fatherland. This road is the organization and conduct of a holy national defensive war of the Chinese people against Japanese imperialism. This platform advances the following demands:

1. The general mobilization of the military (land, sea and air) forces of China for war against Japanese imperialism, for which purpose it is necessary to put a stop to civil war in China.

2. The general mobilization of the population of China for war against Japanese imperialism.

3. The arming of the Chinese people by utilizing all firearms stored in the government and private ammunition arsenals as well as by the purchase of military supplies abroad.

4. To cover the expenses of these military operations, in their initial stage, the platform proposes: (a) the confiscation of the property of the Japanese imperialists (banks, railways, factories, mills, mines, steamship companies, big commercial enterprises and warehouses, etc.); (b) the confiscation of the prop-

erty of all traitors to the national cause; (c) the stoppage of payment on all Japanese loans and interest on these loans; (d) the utilization of all government revenue for financing the war against Japanese imperialism; (e) the introduction of a unified progressive income tax; (f) a broad campaign for the collection of funds among the population of China, among Chinese emigrants abroad, and among all those who are in sympathy with the liberation struggle of the Chinese people.

5. The establishment of an All-Chinese Committee for armed national defense made up of elected representatives from the factories, barracks, villages, schools, universities and commercial enterprises. This committee to be granted the functions of practical administration of all affairs directly pertaining to armed national defense.

6. Unity with all the enemies of Japanese imperialism and primarily with the toilers of Japan, Formosa, Korea and Japan's mandate islands, for a joint struggle against the common enemy. Together with this the platform openly declares that the Chinese people will consider among their friends those powers who support and express sympathy with the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people, or who, in any case, maintain favorable neutrality. As for those who support the aggression of Japanese imperialism against China or who themselves follow the example of Japan and pursue an aggressive policy with regard to China, the Chinese people will consider them their enemies and will combat them as they combat Japanese imperialism.

This platform was greeted with unprecedented sympathy and support on the part of the broad masses of people and has met with support in the foreign and Chinese bourgeois press. The Japanese papers in Shanghai and Manchuria and everywhere else were furious with this platform. Prior to the publication of the platform in the press, in the course of one to one and a half months in Shanghai alone, over 3,000 signatures were collected. Among those who signed this document one finds not only representatives of workers' and peasants' organizations, of soldiers, journalists, scientists, but one finds there the names of many university professors, lawyers, merchants. This platform is signed not only by well-known people in the radical political movement such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Ho Sian-Ing and others, but also the names of many military officers (for example Li Tu, Chang Chin-Ho, etc.), the director of the Chekiang Industrial Bank—Chang Lai-chi, Ma Hsiang-pei, a well-known 86-year-old scientist and politician, and even the name of that well-known politician, Hu Han-ming.

Notwithstanding the fact that Chiang Kai-shek has already issued an order for the arrest of all the signatories of this platform, the campaign for the collection of new signatures is being conducted in

Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Hongkong, Canton and other important cities where it is being met with growing enthusiasm. This campaign is also being conducted abroad among Chinese emigrants, who are interested in saving the fatherland from imperialist oppression.

The working class movement in the larger cities has not only grown in numbers, but it has assumed a qualitatively sharper character. This finds its expression first of all in the extraordinary frequency of armed conflicts between the workers and the police, the gendarmes and the military, and in the general strikes which took place in several branches of industry. A new and very important factor in the movement of the poverty-stricken peasant masses is the fact that the peasant revolts are spreading into the rich provinces of China (Kiangsu and Chekiang), which up till now represented the stronghold of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese bourgeoisie. The peasant movement in the Northwest (Szechuan, Shensi, etc.) and in the Southwestern provinces (Kweichow, Yunnan, etc.), is more and more joining forces with the Soviet Revolution as a result of the victorious advance and gigantic growth of the 2nd, 4th and 6th Red Armies, and of the 42nd Division of the Red Army in these provinces.

Meanwhile, the inner conflicts in the camp of counter-revolution are growing stronger day by day. The war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Canton clique, in connection with the sharpening of the struggle between Japan, Great Britain and America over the Yangtse Basin in South China and the so-called pending all-Chinese Fifth Kuomintang Congress, is becoming one of the problems of the day. Within the Chiang Kai-shek camp a fierce struggle is taking place firstly between the pro-Japanese group headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the pro-American group headed by Wang Ching-wei and the old well-known An-Fu politicians led by Sun Tsi-Un, Sung Fo and others. This struggle is also expressing itself between the Yan Yung-tai-Huang-Hu group and the Huangpu group on the one hand and the Yan Yung-tai-Huang-Hu and Chen Li-Fu, Chen Ko-Fu on the other. Third, it is expressing itself between these three basic groups, each trying to overtake the other in their attempts to gain the favor of Chiang Kai-shek and of Japanese imperialism.

Finally, the Huangpu group itself has been actually split into three contradictory groups: (1) The group of the most reactionary and disintegrated elements—the basic kernel of the so-called Blue Blouse League and the true adherents of Chiang Kai-shek; (2) a group of the elements dissatisfied with the

Chiang Kai-shek treacherous policy but who as yet have not found the correct road of struggle and are therefore supporting the other anti-Chiang Kai-shek military cliques (for example, the Canton clique), and (3) the group of Left radical youth who are greatly dissatisfied with the capitulation policy of Chiang Kai-shek and his surrender to Japan; this group is trying, together with the masses of the people, to struggle for the saving of the fatherland and is prepared to extend its hand to the national-revolutionary movement and revolutionary organizations.

The struggle between these various groups and the groups within the Chiang Kai-shek camp has become sharpened to such an extent that it has led to the destruction of 58 military planes in the Nanking airdrome and of aviation material in the Hanchow warehouses and aviation schools. It is this struggle within the camp of Chiang Kai-shek which has led to the execution of Sui Pi-ging (commander-in-chief of the Chiang Kai-shek air forces and chief of the Hanchow aviation school, one of the outstanding leaders of the Blue Blouses). It has led to the arrest of about 70 well-known activists of the Blue Blouse League, among whom were the private secretary of Chiang Kai-shek, Teng Weng-I, Ho Chung-han and others, and finally, the arrest of the commander-in-chief of Chiang Kai-shek's armies on the eastern front operating against the Central Soviet district, General Chang Ting-wen, who was arrested mainly as a result of his conflict with the governor of Fukien province, General Chang-I, a hireling of Japanese imperialism, and for contact with the Canton group. The struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and the northern militarists, in spite of Japanese interference, is assuming a more definite and sharp character. In the case of war breaking out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Canton group it is inevitable that all of these contradictions between Chiang and his opponents as well as the contradictions between the various groups within the present Chiang Kai-shek camp will come to the surface. The inner struggle in the camp of reaction and the war between the various groups objectively helps the struggle of the Red Army and of the Soviets against Chiang Kai-shek and the imperialists.

Such are the concrete facts which characterize the general political situation in China today. These facts are a proof of the *further growth of the forces of the Soviet Revolution and they show that the basic tendencies in the further development are favorable for a decisive victory of the Red Army over Chiang Kai-shek and Von Seek.*

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

THE year 1934 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the foundation of the Young Communist International.

The creation of the Y.C.I. was preceded by a long struggle on the part of Lenin (the Bolsheviks) against the opportunist attitude towards the role of the youth in the class struggle displayed by the Social-Democratic Parties and by the Second International to which they were affiliated.

The creation of the Y.C.I. was preceded by sagacious, stubborn, prolonged work on the part of Lenin among the revolutionary inclined sections of the West-European youth. It was preceded by the overcoming of its political immaturity, its theoretical confusion and the serious political mistakes on the most important questions of the class struggle. For the very reason that the development of the revolutionary youth movement cannot be studied and investigated apart from the working class movement, apart from the struggle which Lenin (the Bolsheviks) carried on and are still carrying on against opportunism, it is evident that the history of the Y.C.I. cannot be limited to these fifteen years alone. But it is an absolutely indisputable historical fact, however, that the first congress of the Y.C.I. was called on the initiative of the great founder of the international Communist youth movement—Lenin—and that this congress took place in Berlin in 1919.

It is indisputable, moreover, that the chief role in fulfilling Lenin's idea—of creating the Y.C.I. and convening its first Congress—was played by the Russian Young Communist League which was fighting under the Comintern banner for unity among the Left Socialist youth organizations. However, in spite of this and other obvious facts, Kemrod* has asserted that "the international conference of the Socialist youth which took place in Stuttgart in 1907" may be taken as the first congress of the Y.C.I. This, in a more cautious way, has been pointed out by Schiller,** another poor historian.

These incorrect viewpoints compel us first and foremost to throw some light upon the role and importance of the Stuttgart conference in the international revolutionary movement as a whole.

STUTTGART

A complete and clear idea of the struggle carried

* Kemrod: worked as editor of the periodical, *Smena*. Author of several symposiums on questions of the history of the Y.C.I.

** Richard Schiller: from 1919 to 1928, member of the Presidium of the Y.C.I. Now working in the Austrian Communist Party.

on by Bolshevism against reformism and Centrism, even in the pre-war years, and against the social-chauvinists and Kautskyists during the war, on the question of the participation of the youth in the class struggle, can be seen from a conscientious study of the works of Lenin, of the documents of the Bolshevik Party and of the Second International. The consistent and unswerving viewpoint defended by Lenin on the revolutionary education of the youth can be expressed briefly in his own famous words:

"All knowledge of Communism from Communist pamphlets and publications is absolutely worthless without work, without the struggle. . . .

" . . . We must stand unconditionally for organizational independence for the Youth League, not only because the opportunists are afraid of independence of this kind, but for the real essence of the problem itself. For without complete independence, the youth cannot either make themselves good Socialists or prepare to bring socialism forward."

Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht came close to understanding this Leninist definition of the fundamental tasks of the revolutionary education of the youth.

However, their efforts to create and activate the youth organizations in the class struggle, within the framework of the Second International, were unsuccessful. They were unsuccessful because the Second International and its parties were Marxist in words, in their resolutions, while pursuing a policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie in actual practice, which determined their disgraceful bankruptcy during the imperialist war. An opportunist viewpoint reigned in the Second International concerning the organizational independence of the youth and their participation in the class struggle. This was expressed concretely in the fact that the youth were deprived not only of organizational independence, but of the right to any active political life and struggle.

The Socialist youth organizations which grew up regardless of the will of the Second International leadership were under a guardianship which aimed at converting them into cultural and non-political organizations. The more active elements in the youth movement, however, headed by Karl Liebknecht, could not reconcile themselves to this attitude to the role of the youth. In 1907, at the international conference in Stuttgart, they tried to create an international organization of youth organizations and to define their main political tasks. This attempt to create an international youth organization and to

define its main political tasks within the framework of the Second International was doomed to failure.

The International Youth Bureau formed at the Stuttgart conference was not a leading organ, but a politically inactive organ for information, which, together with the Second International, ceased to exist during the war. The conference decisions did not arm the youth organizations for struggle against capitalism. The decisions did not coincide with the Leninist doctrine of the role of the youth in the class struggle and led the youth organizations towards political passivity. Consequently, the Stuttgart conference constitutes the first attempt of the young Socialist organizations to create an international organization of the youth, and is not the first Y.C.I. congress, which laid the foundations for the new stage in the development of the international revolutionary youth movement.

BERNE

Certain "historians" as, for example, Munzenberg, try to prove that the Y.C.I. was formed actually not in 1907 and not in 1919, but in 1915, at the Berne conference of Young Socialist organizations. They want to prove that what took place in Berlin in 1919 was merely the "transformation" of the Youth International founded at Berne, into the Y.C.I.; or, in other words, what "had already come about politically long ago", had then taken shape.

This is untrue and does not correspond to the historical facts.

What is true is that in 1915, during the war, a conference of Left Socialist youth organizations took place in Berne. At this conference a new international organization was formed which defined the main tasks of the youth organizations in the struggle against imperialist war.

However, the fact cannot be deleted from the history of the international youth movement that *the Berne conference came out against the Leninist proposals of the Bolsheviks* concerning the fight against imperialist war, and rejected them.

And so Munzenberg took upon himself a thankless task, quite beyond his strength, when he tried to refute Lenin, who pointed out that the Berne youth conference constituted at best a step "marking time" in the struggle against the social-chauvinist parties which entered the service of the bourgeoisie.

How can we, after that, assert that the Berne conference and those who convened it, laid the foundations of the Young Communist International?

This must not be done especially because of the fact that Lenin tirelessly sought to overcome their theoretical confusion, politically incorrect theories and mistakes, and to bring closer to Bolshevism the youth organizations whom he highly esteemed in the struggle against imperialist war. The same attitude did

he have against the *International of Youth*, a magazine which was published during the war.

This stage of the development of the youth movement deserves serious study; but what has been said is sufficient to make clear how certain "historians" distort the facts.

BERLIN

Lenin is the founder of the Young Communist International. It was on his initiative and with the active support of the Young Communist League of the Soviet Union and under the guidance of the Comintern, that the first congress of the Young Communist International was convened in 1919.

The following were represented at this congress: the Comintern, the Russian Young Communist League, the Communist organization of the German Volga Republic, Poland, Hungary, the Socialist youth organizations of Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Austria.

The convening of this congress signified the organizational and political unity of the scattered youth organizations on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist program of the Comintern, which unites all the revolutionary forces of the working class in the struggle against capitalism and for the proletarian dictatorship. The formation of the Y.C.I. opened up a new epoch in the international revolutionary youth movement.

The creation of the Y.C.I. and its affiliation to the Comintern required enormous reorganizations of the revolutionary youth organizations which had joined the Y.C.I. It was necessary to overcome the confusion that reigned inside of them on basic political questions. It was not merely a question of "transforming" and shaping what "had already come about long ago".

During the first Y.C.I. congress, this was still not clear to many congress delegates, including Munzenberg himself, who headed the Berne International.

At the first congress, the representatives of the youth organizations unanimously decided to affiliate ideologically to the Comintern. However, on the question of affiliation to the Comintern, of organizational connections with it and of recognizing the leadership of the Comintern, many delegates, including Munzenberg, had hesitations and doubts which developed into openly advocating *non-affiliation* to the Comintern.

At the first congress these hesitations were overcome. After this congress, right up to the second congress of the Y.C.I., misunderstandings of the Leninist doctrine on the role of the youth in the class struggle were reflected again in the work of the E.C. of the Y.C.I.

UNDER THE BANNER OF THE COMINTERN

The creation of the Y.C.I., its development and

consolidation, is a brilliant page in the struggle of Lenin (the Bolsheviks) against opportunism both in the working class and in the youth movement, in the struggle to educate the youth in the spirit of Communism.

Fifteen years have passed since the opening of the first inaugural congress of the Y.C.I. It is difficult today to name a country where there is no Section of the Y.C.I. or any Communist youth organization. In the country which is victoriously building socialism, the leading Section of the Y.C.I. has become a mighty organization with millions of members who are selflessly fighting under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party to build up a classless socialist society.

In the capitalist countries, the Communist youth with its heroic struggle for the proletarian dictatorship and for the interests of the working class and youth calls forth the bestial hatred of the bourgeoisie and the admiration of the toilers.

In Spain the Young Communists under the leadership of the Communist Party have won for themselves the honored name of foremost fighters against capitalism, in the barricade fights side by side with the revolutionary workers and miners of Asturias and of the whole country.

In China, the Young Communist League is the most loyal supporter of the Communist Party in its struggle against international imperialism and on behalf of the Soviet Government. The heroic Young Communist regiments and divisions of the Red Army have covered themselves with undying glory in the heroic fight against the mercenary white army of Chiang Kai-shek.

In countries of fascist terror and unbridled reaction—Japan, Germany, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria—everywhere, in Cuba and in far off Indo-China, the Young Communists are bearing high the Leninist banner of the Comintern, the banner of irreconcilable class struggle against capitalism.

The bourgeoisie is striving to annihilate physically the Young Communists who are preparing for the overthrow of capitalism.

Hundreds of our best comrades have perished in the ruthless class struggle.

Thousands more have been thrown into jails, sentenced to hard labor and concentration camps by the hangmen.

But the terror cannot prevent the growth of Communist influence and the development of the revolutionary youth movement.

The bourgeoisie is powerless to educate the youth in a slavish spirit or tear them from the class struggle, by establishing a compulsory system of fascization and militarization of the youth.

The task of the Young Communist Leagues today is not to record November 20, formally, as the date of the opening of the Y.C.I. congress, but to test

the whole road of struggle that has been passed during these fifteen years.

Many Young Communist Leagues are still not mass organizations, and in some places even now the work of these organizations, both as regards character and methods adopted, resembles the work of the Socialist youth organizations, which are little active.

It is for just this reason that it is of especially great importance today to explain the role which Lenin played in the international youth movement and to arm all Young Communists and young workers with the Leninist doctrines of the class struggle.

The most important thing in putting the Leninist doctrine into practice is to gather millions of the youth on the basis of the united front and under the banner of the Comintern to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for a Soviet government.

In fighting for all this, even for the smallest economic, political and cultural interests of the youth, we must, with the whole of our energy, mobilize the youth to fight against the danger of an imperialist attack upon the Soviet Union and against the danger of imperialist war.

While fighting with all determination against chauvinism and nationalism, every Young Communist should firmly remember the instructions of Comrade Stalin, who carries forward the work of Lenin, the mighty leader of the working class: "Internationalism is the basic idea which runs throughout the work of the Young Communist League. Therein lies its strength. Therein is its might."

What can divide the Young Socialists and the Y.C.L.'ers in Spain who fought together in October and who are now suffering equally from the white terror which can only be compared to the terror after the Paris Commune? There is no force which would be capable of destroying this alliance, sealed with the blood of those who died in the struggle. The Y.C.L. is now faced with an enormous task—of inculcating this idea among the broad masses of the youth and explaining to these masses in the light of the October struggles all the questions of principle, tactics and methods of struggle of the Y.C.L.

Thus the Y.C.L. of Spain under the leadership of the Communist Party will continue the struggle with greater force than ever to win the majority of the working class youth for the triumph of Communism.

The Lerroux government, this Spanish Thiers, is now using severe and inhuman repression against the heroic Spanish proletariat. Thousands of old and young workers have died under the fire of the cannon and the military squadrons of the "Versailles troops". Sixty thousand working class fighters are entombed in capitalist dungeons, and the special military courts have condemned scores to death or to lifelong imprisonment. The danger of the death sentence hangs

over the heads of the best soldiers of the workers' and peasants' revolution. Drunken colonial troops swagger through the workers' sections as through a conquered territory. It is a matter of honor for the youth and for the working class of the whole world to hold back the bloody attack of fascism and help the Spanish proletariat to restore its forces.

The working class of Spain has retreated, but is not defeated. The struggle still continues. Armed with the experience obtained in the October fighting, the working class is aiming to raise the banner of Soviet Power, which waved victoriously for 15 days in Asturias, over the whole of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Spain.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF CHINA

By WANG FU

IT is difficult to imagine the misery, hunger and suffering in the cities and villages of Kuomintang China. The population is undergoing an existence of hunger and misery. Factories and mills are being closed. In Shanghai alone out of 130 textile mills, 95 are closed; in Nanchen out of 30 textile mills only two are working. In Kiangsin (Hopei Province) 47,000 workers are employed in industry and over 100,000 are unemployed. In Szechuan in the textile mills, 80 per cent of the workers have been dismissed, in the salt industry of this province 90 per cent and in the silk industry 50 per cent of the workers are unemployed. Hundreds of thousands of unemployed, whose only perspective is starvation, fill the streets of the Chinese cities.

The existence of such a huge army of unemployed is utilized by the capitalists for a terrific increase in exploitation. If before, one worker minded six machines and received a maximum of 80 cents (one Chinese dollar equals one-fourth to one-third of a U.S. dollar), at the present one worker minds ten machines and his wages have been reduced to 40 cents. By means of this traditional system of contracting labor known as "Bogun", the capitalists dismiss adult workers and engage children. The "Bogun" system work as follows:

The employer sends his special agents to the districts suffering from bad harvests or to the slave markets which exist not only in the countryside, but in such big cities as Tientsin and Peiping, etc. (In Szechuan there are special offices dealing in children.) These agents, by paying the parents from 8 to 10 dollars for a child of 8-16 years, take these children to the factories where they become the slaves of the employers and in the course of the first three or five years work in special shops isolated from the outside world. In the course of these years the only people they know are their supervisors. The food they receive is very poor. In the Japanese textile factories in China these children constitute about 20 per cent of the total number of workers. The same, approximately, is the position in other factories.

But the situation of the working class youth is perhaps not better than the life of these little slaves.

In the mills of Shanghai children between the ages of 6 and 12 constitute 50 per cent of all the workers. Whereas the adult workers receive 45-50 cents for the working day, these children receive only from 10 to 20 cents for a 12-hour working day. If we add to this the fact that the price of rice has doubled, then it is clear that these wages are not sufficient even for a semi-starvation existence.

The workers of the cotton mills of Tientsin are exclusively youth. In the place of 100 adult workers the mill-owners have engaged 30 young workers who are compelled to produce the amount of 100 adult workers in a working day of 14 to 15 hours. Their meagre wages do not allow them even a semi-starvation existence. To this must be added that wages are sometimes not paid for three or four months at a stretch and that a great portion of these meagre wages is kept by the employer in the form of fines, which in many cases reach 25 per cent of the wages. If we add to this the fact that these young workers are often severely beaten by their supervisors, one receives a full picture of the life of the working class youth in Kuomintang China. It is no better in the villages. The Chinese journal *Sing Chum Go* publishes the following data:

"On the basis of investigations of a committee consisting of foreigners and Chinese for the relief of the famine-stricken districts, the total population suffering from the famine is now 119,000,000. The peasantry confronted with these terrible conditions created by nature and man has only one way out—death."

In Hupei province alone 10,000,000 of the native population and refugees (of whom 7,000,000 are youth) are living on grass, tree roots, etc.

In the cities one finds unemployment and slave conditions in the factories. In the villages the "far-seeing politicians" have only the prospect of death to offer to the peasants. Where is the way out of this? The weaker, those who cannot bear these con-

ditions, find no way out and commit suicide. Suicide has become a very common phenomenon in the life of Kuomintang China.

But an ever-growing section of the toiling population, led by the heroic Communist Party of China, is finding the only way out—the revolutionary struggle. The strike movement is growing. The number of peasant actions is increasing, the revolutionary partisan movement is growing throughout China.

In this desperate struggle for liberation from slavery and poverty the Young Communist League of China, the faithful supporter of the Communist Party, is organizing and leading in battles the working class and peasant youth of China. The members of the Y.C.L. are working under conditions of severe illegality in the Kuomintang district of China and Manchuria. Death is the sentence given to those who belong to the Young Communist League, irrespective of the position occupied in the League. But, notwithstanding this, the Young Communist League is organizing the strike movement of the youth. In April, 1933, in Shanghai, the Y.C.L. organized and led a general strike of textile workers. In the course of two months in the spring of last year the Y.C.L. organized nine demonstrations of the young unemployed. In Nantung the young textile workers, armed with stones, fought against the government troops. In one of the *muniton plants* in Szechuan, where the workers were driven into the shops at the point of revolvers, the workers in reply to this, and at the initiative of the members of the Y.C.L. in the plant, began to destroy the machinery and for a long time the plant could not operate.

In the coal mines of Hopei province the local Young Communist League organization led three strikes, it organized more than 30 mass meetings of protest against the Kuomintang attack on the Soviet districts, it organized a delegation of 100 workers to the Soviet districts and in the course of three weeks it published a young workers' paper (with a circulation of 300) which was passed from worker to worker.

In the tobacco workers' strike, the Y.C.L. played a leading role. In September 1932 the tobacco workers went on strike for the seventh time; on the average the tobacco workers were striking three times a year. The last tobacco workers' strike involved 8,000 workers and lasted eight weeks.

In the struggle of the peasants against taxes and for the reduction in rent, the Young Communist League also played an important role. In one of the districts of Hopei province in the period of August-October 1933, the Y.C.L. organized 25 peasant actions, of which 20 resulted in victory for the peasants. In another district in the period of November 1933-January 1934, the Young Communist League led 20 actions of the peasants and in ten cases these actions resulted in victory. In connection

with these activities in the villages self-defense detachments, vanguard detachments and Young Guard detachments have been organized.

In this struggle many young men and women, devoted fighters of the revolution, have been thrown into prisons or executed. In Shanghai alone last year police agents and provocateurs organized 36 mass arrests and arrested over 1,000 members of the Y.C.L. All of the arrested, as a rule, notwithstanding terrible tortures at the hands of the police, behaved as revolutionaries should behave. There are many examples of the heroic conduct of our comrades in the history of the Chinese Y.C.L.

When Comrade Hu Lang-chen, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Y.C.L., was arrested, the Kuomintang henchmen told him he could save his life by rejecting his Communist views, in other words, by turning traitor. Comrade Hu Lang-chen, notwithstanding terrible torture at the hands of the police, refused to sign a declaration to this effect. Then the police told him "If you do not reject your Communist convictions we shall execute your parents". But even this threat had no effect. Hu Lang-chen's father and mother were put to death in his presence and after this Hu Lang-chen declared "You have killed my father and mother, I have only one thing left—the cause of the working class for which I am prepared to die". And Hu Lang-chen was executed.

Comrade Ma Tu-fu, the Secretary of the Shantung Provincial Committee of the Y.C.L. and the organizer of a general strike of textile workers in the Japanese mills in Tsindao, was arrested by the police and tortured terribly while in prison. This comrade showed an outstanding example of heroism: in the last moment before his death he shouted: "Long Live the Communist Party and Y.C.L.! Long Live the victory of the Soviet revolution throughout China!"

Death does not stop these brave warriors of the revolution. In parting with life they maintain the firm belief that their place in the Y.C.L. will be taken by new comrades who, with heads raised high, will carry forward the banner of struggle for Soviet China.

This is indeed so. The banner of struggle is borne forward by the young workers in the mines, mills, factories, railways and villages. The Young Communist League is growing in the districts of white China, notwithstanding the desperate attempts of the Kuomintang henchmen to crush our organization. The Y.C.L. organization in the coal mines of Mingtaudi (Hopei Province) has increased its membership in one month twelvefold, in the textile mills of Shanghai the Y.C.L. has trebled its membership and in Hopei Province there are organizations which have multiplied their membership five to eight times. The social composition of the Y.C.L. is improving: for-

merly in the city organizations the number of young workers constituted on the average 50 per cent, at present it is 62 per cent. New forces are entering our movement, new courageous warriors prepared to sacrifice their lives in the struggle for national and social liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of Japan, of world imperialism and of the Kuomintang, in the struggle for the victory of the Soviets in China. The courage of these comrades cannot be broken by bayonets or death sentences.

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In the hills of Manchuria where the revolting peasants make their camp the members of the Young Communist League organize and lead detachments of Young Partisans. During one of the battles of the partisans, when an attack was made upon an estate occupied by Japanese picked troops, 30 young peasants armed only with revolvers charged the enemy. When they were told about the superiority of the enemy's forces their reply was: "We will die, but we will first destroy this nest of counter-revolution". In the first attack the leader of the detachment, a member of the Y.C.L., received fatal wounds. A few moments before his death he said to his comrades, "Here is my revolver, don't surrender to the enemy; destroy this fort". Towards dawn, when these young partisans made their way to the hills, carrying with them the bodies of four comrades killed in battle, this counter-revolutionary nest had been destroyed.

We can cite a number of other examples of mass heroism of the Chinese Young Communists who are courageously struggling for the cause of the working class, for the liberation of China from the imperialist yoke and from the hands of the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang, for the victory of the Soviets in China.

YOUTH IN SOVIET CHINA

Let us now investigate the position of the youth in the Soviet districts of China. Here a system of equal pay for equal work of youth and adults has been introduced. The employment of children under 14 is forbidden by law, the term of apprenticeship has been reduced, wages have been increased and the system of buying and selling young women into marriage has been abolished. The material conditions of the workers have considerably improved. The amount of money spent by a worker in the Soviet districts on food alone for one month is equal to the annual wages of a farm-hand in Kuomintang China.

All of this has created the conditions for a broad mobilization of the toiling people of China in the struggle for the Soviets. The youth, seeing the Soviets are the only way leading to the abolition of slavery, starvation and poverty, have linked their fate with that of Soviet Power.

During the so-called week for the "liquidation of bandits" organized in Kuomintang China the Central Committee of the Y.C.L. undertook serious work in defending the Soviet Districts of China. The Y.C.L. published and distributed thousands of leaflets against the Sixth Drive of Chiang Kai-shek. Here are some of the slogans issued by the Y.C.L.:

"Young factory and mill workers, radio operators, doctors and technicians—join the Y.C.I. Division of the Red Army", "Down with the Kuomintang and its policy of imperialist division of China", "Young peasants! Don't pay one cent of taxes; these taxes are utilized by the Kuomintang for the war against the Red Army and the murder of workers and peasants!", "Young soldiers, organize actions against the sending of troops to the south for an attack against the Red Army! Organize a revolutionary mutiny, establish soldiers' committees, kill your reactionary officers and elect your own commanders!", "Together with the peasant masses organize the partisan war!", "Contribute to the fund to build the 'Hupei youth' airplane", "Every young worker must contribute one cent to help the Red Army".

With the active support of the broad masses of toilers, five campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary army have been defeated. The Young Communist League in the white districts organized several protest actions against the present Sixth Campaign. Several thousands of dollars have been collected to aid the Red Army.

"When the Red Army enters a new district," tells one Red Army soldier, "crowds of toilers meet them with shouts of 'Down with the Kuomintang and the Imperialists', 'Hail the victory of the Red Army!'"

The Young Communist League in the Soviet districts has been doing important work in helping the Party to strengthen the might of the Red Army. The plans of the recent recruiting campaign in the Red Army have been over-fulfilled. The youth constitute over 50 per cent of the new recruits and 25 per cent of all new recruits are members of the Young Communist League. In this tense situation of struggle against the armies of Chiang Kai-shek the Young Communist League advanced the idea of establishing a youth division named in honor of the Y.C.I. This idea met with favorable response among the members of the Y.C.L. and the toiling youth in general. In Zhutsin eight Y.C.L. groups joined this division. In the city of Ninhua the local Young Communist Group during the first mobilization supplied 28 recruits and 19 in the second mobilization. Complete exemplary detachments of the Young Guard joined the Red Army. In the district of Ganchuan (Kiangsi Province) 80 per cent, and in Tsaisi (Fukien Province) 88 per cent of the youth, including young women, joined the Red Army and went to the front.

When the Y.C.I. division was formed, the commanding staff of the Chinese Red Army, in greeting this initiative of the Y.C.L., in its message to the new division said: "You must arm yourself with firearms captured from the enemy". In the very first battle the new Y.C.I. division showed outstanding examples of bravery. In this battle it captured firearms from the enemy and later it became one of the best outfitted units of the Chinese Red Army. Besides this, a "Young Guards" division has also been organized and has courageously fought against the enemy.

The Central Committee of the Y.C.L. issued the slogan "not less than half of the young soldiers must be members of the Y.C.L." Around this slogan great political work was initiated, competitions have begun in all the army units for better work among the youth and at present in many of the regiments over half of the soldiers are members of the Y.C.L.

No small role in the consolidation of the Red Army must be accredited to the Y.C.L. girls of the Soviet districts. These comrades have been conducting propaganda work on a large scale, recruiting their husbands, brothers and friends into the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Every girl member of the Y.C.L. in Soviet China has recruited, on an average, six new Red Army soldiers.

The members of the Y.C.L. remaining behind the lines are no less active in the work of strengthening the Red Army. They make it their duty to look after the families of the Red Army soldiers, organize voluntary labor for sowing their land and reaping the harvest. Besides this, they continually help the members of the Red Army soldiers' families on their farms. The girls and children make footwear out of rice stocks, knit socks and make underwear and caps for their brothers, fighting against Chiang Kai-shek.

In the district of Singo every member of the Y.C.L. saved one and a half kilograms of rice and presented this to the Red Army. In another district every member of the Y.C.L. and Young Pioneers took upon themselves the obligation of raising five mellons for the Red Army.

The Red Army is grateful for this help and one of its soldiers, Comrade Vanu Tin expresses this in the following words:

"Even brothers and sisters do not help each other in such a way as the local population helps the families of the Red Army soldiers. I can fight against the enemy and am always sure that my old parents will be looked after."

The heroic conduct of the youth and particularly the members of the Y.C.L. in battle can be seen from the following examples:

A young bugler Li Kon, during the advance on the city of Shanhan, which, because of the difficulty

in capturing it was nick-named "iron Shanhan" by the Red Army soldiers, made his way up to the top of the city wall and sounded the alarm signal. This immediately caused panic in the city and the enemy garrison retreated. Thus the Red Army captured Shanhan. Soon after this Li Kon was fatally wounded in battle. His last words were: "In dying I have only one wish—the rapid victory of the Soviets".

Here is another example. Sixteen-year-old Sung was taken prisoner by the whites. During his imprisonment he constantly carried on agitation among the Kuomintang soldiers and after two years returned to the Red Army with a large group of Kuomintang soldiers, bringing with them a big supply of ammunition.

In the battles on the outskirts of the city of Ninhua, when the 52nd and 59th Chiang Kai-shek divisions were routed by the Red Army, the remnants of these divisions found their way to the hills. Ten members of the Y.C.L. went into the hills to capture ammunition. Here they came face to face with a whole company of white troops. The Y.C.L. comrades did not lose their presence of mind; pretending that they had hand grenades and were prepared to attack, they ordered the enemy to surrender. A Chinese proverb says: "Fright Causes Alarm"—the white soldiers were so terrified that they thought this group of young people were the vanguard of a strong Red Army detachment and surrendered all of their arms to ten young Red Army soldiers! Our young comrades, after taking over the firearms, explained to the whites what the Soviets are and why it is necessary to defend Soviet China. The result of all this was that our Young Communists won over this whole company to our side.

Another characteristic example is the following: the counter-revolutionary troops entrenched themselves in a fort and made it impossible for our detachments to approach the city. The forts surrounding this city were located in such a way that by destroying one of the forts it would be possible to capture the town. A company of Young Communists, 150 strong, decided to charge and capture this fort. From a height of ten metres,* in the face of terrific machine-gun fire, these young comrades began their advance. Five times the commander of the company was changed, four commanders were killed in battle, but the company continued its advance. The wounded soldiers who could no longer carry on the fight refused to be removed from the field and shouted to their comrades "On with the advance! Capture the fort, we shall not leave the field until the fort is ours!" The fort was captured and this made it possible for the Red Army to capture the town.

At another section of the front, a youth company

* About 30 feet.

as given the task of coming into contact with the Red Army in another province. Notwithstanding the fact that in fulfilling this task our soldiers were suffering from complete absence of food in the course of four days and had to withstand five enemy attacks daily, the task was fulfilled.

A division operating on the Eastern front in Fukien province, in breaking the economic blockade in the city of Yenping, captured 12 shiploads of foodstuffs and succeeded in transporting this to the central Soviet districts. After penetrating behind Chiang Kai-shek's lines and coming into contact with other detachments of the Red Army this division organized the new Soviet district of Menshun. The chief of the political department of this division, Comrade Siao-Hua, in the beginning of his career was officer's servant, and at the age of 14 he already participated in battles. The chief of the political department of the Y.C.I. division, during the operations on the Western front, Siao-Hua, was always in the foremost ranks, serving as an example for all of the

soldiers. In 1931 he was considered one of the best political commissars of the Red Army of China.

The heroism of the individual Chinese Red Army soldiers and of the Chinese Red Army as a whole can only be explained by the class hatred against the enemy, by the desire of the soldiers to free themselves from slavery and poverty, from the yoke of the imperialists and the bourgeois-landlord Kuomintang. The battle front is extending and the day of historical clashes is nearing. Millions of the Chinese masses are becoming convinced that the Red Army soldier Wanu Tin was correct when he declared: "I now realize that the Soviet Power is our own power. I realize that only by the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeois-landlord Kuomintang and the imperialists will the victory of the Soviets throughout China be possible. Only in the struggles for this victory can I achieve my own liberation."

That is why the Soviets are growing and conquering, for the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is invincible.

THE COMMUNIST YOUTH OF SPAIN AT THE BARRICADES

By A. PERES

THE working class of Spain met the fascist-clerical government of Lerroix-Gil Robles with arms. The general strike throughout the country spread not only to the workers in the chief industries but to the very broadest strata of the toiling population. Throughout all of Catalonia and Asturias, in Leone and Madrid and other places, the general strike was accompanied by an armed struggle. In Asturias the Soviet Power was established and remained in power for 15 days, driving the international bourgeoisie into a panic.

One of the most characteristic features of the October fighting is the fact that the toiling youth fought shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary proletariat of Spain, in spite of all the efforts of the bourgeoisie to prevent this. The clearest expression of the striving of the bourgeoisie and of the landlords to break away the toiling youth from the working class was the law pertaining to associations passed on August 28, 1934. This law was a continuation of the anti-labor law passed on April 8, 1932, at the initiative of Largo Caballero, and prohibited young people under the age of 23 entering political organizations. By means of this fascist law, the ruling classes of Spain wished to destroy the revolutionary organizations of the youth, first and foremost the Y.C.L. of Spain.

But the passing of this law called forth still greater political activity among the youth of town and village, among the students and the oppressed struggle against the ruling classes. In Madrid (at

the beginning of September) the Y.C.L. and the Young Socialists organized a tremendous protest meeting against this law. The meeting was attended by 90,000 toilers, most of them youth. At the same time in Seville, Caravanchel (Madrid), etc., there were a whole series of demonstrations and mass actions which were also a protest against the law of August 28. In the two to three months preceding the armed fighting in October, the struggle of the toiling youth and their participation in the general activity of the working class reached unprecedented measures in Spain.

The 19th International Youth Day (September 1) in Spain was a day of energetic activity of the youth and of united front anti-fascist struggles. In Sama de Langreo, Mieres, Eibar, Crevilente, etc., the Y.C.L. members and the Young Socialists held a united front demonstration. In Sama de Langreo, which became a Soviet district a few days later, shots were exchanged between the police and the demonstration, and a Young Socialist was killed. On the next day, 12,000 workers declared a strike of protest.

The mighty development of the united front and the inculcation in the minds of the masses of the necessity for the violent overthrow of capitalism—such are the most characteristic manifestations of the revolutionizing of the youth in the days preceding the armed struggles. Examples of this are the anti-youth of the national minorities, and intensified the fascist mobilization of the youth, such as the demon-

stration organized by the Y.C.L. of Madrid on the occasion of the funeral of Comrade de Grado, which was attended by 60,000 workers. Further, we saw the heroic participation of the youth in the preparation and development of big anti-fascist general strikes in Madrid and Asturias on September 8, the strikes which prepared for the great October days and the revolutionary actions of the youth in the general struggle. If we were to ask the young workers of Madrid, Asturias, Biscay, Catalonia or any other part of the country their opinion on the present-day political situation and how to act in the future, they would answer: strengthen the united front, develop anti-fascist activity and prepare for the seizure of power. The idea of taking capitalism by storm has matured in the minds of the toiling masses, especially in the minds of the broad masses of the exploited youth.

Mundo Obrero reports a characteristic case which took place in a popular movie theatre in Madrid and which showed the frame of mind of the youth. In this movie, which is patronized chiefly by young workers and children, a picture was being shown distorting the openly anti-monarchist and democratic character of the struggle of Galan and Garcia Ernanandes who were shot by the last monarchist government. When the priest came on the screen the spectators shouted at the top of their voices: "Down with reaction and fascism! Death to the monarchists!" When the soldiers appeared on the screen, the whole audience rose and sang the International.

Of course, in such an atmosphere the youth fought with the greatest boldness, and detachments of armed youth took the initiative in attacking the prisons and liberating revolutionary prisoners. In Barcelona, at the time when the troops were occupying the building, a young woman radio operator remained in front of the microphone calling on the toiling masses of Catalonia to continue their struggle for national liberation. Her last words were: "Fight for freedom! This is being said to you by a woman dying for the freedom of Catalonia." In Asturias the Y.C.L. members and the Young Socialists took part together in the armed struggle. The bourgeois press of all shades, from the most reactionary to the so-called liberal papers, wrote with horror that "among the killed there were the bodies of 14 and 15-year-old children still grasping their weapons".

The Chronicle, one of the most virulent illustrated papers of the counter-revolution, reporting the seizure of power in Lava, wrote, on October 21, that "the majority of the revolutionaries were boys of 16 to 20 years of age or even younger. . . . There were also women, nearly all of them young, most of them being the wives or daughters of the miners."

The Y.C.L. was the best supporter of the Communist Party in its struggle to win the majority of the working class for the seizure of power. Under the

concrete conditions prevailing in Spain, these two gigantic tasks were directly connected with the organization of the united front. And in this sphere the Y.C.L. fought tirelessly to carry out the political line of the Communist Party among the masses of the youth.

As the result of a series of peculiar circumstances there were favorable possibilities for conducting the broad united front of struggle among the youth. Therefore, the youth organizations were the boldest in realizing them. At the Plenum of the C.C. of the Party in September 1934, the Y.C.L., therefore, stated that "it agreed with the position of the Party but considered that it could go further than the Party in respect to the united front".

The first serious steps for carrying out the united front were the meetings of the Central leaders of the Y.C.L. and of the Young Socialists in June 1934. But these meetings did not yet lead to a concrete agreement on the united front. The chief disagreement arose around the question of the preparations for a revolt. The representatives of the Young Socialists denied the effectiveness and necessity of developing a direct struggle for partial demands. The Y.C.L. stated that the armed rising could not be the result of a declaration on paper and "technical" preparations alone. The rising could only be prepared in the everyday struggle, and this struggle needed to be developed, and on this basis the level of the revolutionary offensive of the proletariat should be raised. Allies had to be won for the proletariat, drawing the peasants and the broad masses of the toilers into the revolutionary struggle. This thesis, these principles, supported by the Y.C.L. with the greatest firmness, appear prominently in the whole of the polemic with the Young Socialists.

The development of the armed struggle showed how correct had been this position of the Y.C.L. It showed the necessity to prepare for the uprising by the development of the direct struggle of the proletariat, the necessity for winning allies for the proletariat, and showed the way to win them. In spite of the fact that the Y.C.L. was unable to come to an agreement with the Young Socialists, the friendly tone was maintained in the negotiations and the very fact that these negotiations were taking place had a definite influence on the rapprochement of the Socialist workers and the Communist Party. These negotiations were not only a gigantic step along the path of bringing about the united front of the youth, but also in bringing about the united front between the Communist Party and the Social-Democratic masses.

The Y.C.L. fought for the destruction of all the barriers thrown up by the enemies of the united front between the Y.C.L. and the masses of the Socialist youth. The Y.C.L. in this struggle did not lose its consistent Communist position.

In removing all the difficulties which hindered the

united front, the Y.C.L. maintained an unshakable position on questions of principles. With the exception of a few insignificant points, the general political line conducted by the Spanish Y.C.L. on the question of the united front was correct. The Y.C.L. showed that it was able to keep its independent positions and carry out the definite class policy of the Communists.

Although agreement could not be reached on a central scale regarding joint activity with the Y.C.L., the local Young Socialist organizations in Asturias, in Jaen and other places, accepted the proposal of the Y.C.L. for joint activity. It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the leaders of the Young Socialists openly spoke against partial and immediate activity, all the agreements on the united front which were concluded in the localities were based precisely on a platform containing a series of concrete demands requiring immediate actions. And this shows that the overwhelming majority of the Young Socialists had adopted the point of view of the Y.C.L. on the question of the character of the immediate struggle and its connection with the armed uprising.

Let us look into the agreement of the united front concluded, for example, between the Y.C.L. and the Young Socialists of Asturias. One of the most important points of the joint manifesto which they published was the struggle against the fascist march on September 8, which was the cause of the general strike of the proletariat in Asturias, a strike which was of a militant revolutionary character and which already contained definite elements of the armed struggle. The fact that the Y.C.L. put the struggle against this fascist march at the center of its proposals to the Young Socialists gave it great political authority. The Y.C.L. of Asturias, in extending this agreement on the united front, was able a month later to lead the masses of the toiling youth to the struggle when the general strike and the armed uprising took place in Asturias, concretely helping the Communist Party in the preparation of these fights.

In September the Extraordinary Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Spain, called to discuss the question of the united front and joining the Workers' Alliance, decided to join this Alliance. This decision of the Party, which some elements tried to characterize as giving up their position, was merely the logical continuation of the consistent policy of the united front conducted by the Communist Party. The Y.C.L. whose position on the question of the Workers' Alliance was and is determined by the position of the Party, also joined these organizations.

The discontent of the young Spanish Socialists with the Young Socialist International (which has tremendously increased at the present time in connection with the refusal of Olenhauer to accept the struggle in defense of the Spanish proletariat) has

reached such a point that the Executive Committee proposal of the Y.C.I. for the organization of a of the Young Socialists has organized a referendum on the question: "Shall we remain in the Second International or resign from it?"

At the beginning of the armed struggle, five local organizations (in the province of Granada) not only voted for leaving the Second International but stated that "there is only one path to victory—the path of Lenin and of the Third International".

Even before the organization of the referendum, considerable numbers of Young Socialists were coming over to the Y.C.L. In less than two months over 900 Young Socialists came over to the Y.C.L. Whole organizations such as those in Lavavillar and Orella (the latter having 192 members) stated: "We are going over to the Y.C.L. so as to fight really for the united front and the dictatorship of the proletariat." In face of these facts, the Y.C.L. expressed its will to struggle for the united revolutionary organization of the youth. This was correct and proper before the armed struggle took place and is still more correct and proper now that this struggle has taken place.

The most characteristic feature of the revolutionary youth movement of Spain is the fact that while the Young Socialist organization has abandoned all its positions, the Y.C.L. has stood firmly on its principles.

Several months ago, the Young Socialists who defended bourgeois democracy and recommended it as the best path for socialism, had to decide for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus the whole course of events proved the correctness of the political line of the Y.C.L., the irreconcilable struggle against any form of bourgeois domination, including the democratic form, and the consistent struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Not long ago the leaders of the Young Socialists created serious hindrances to the establishment of the united front of struggle, insistently ignoring the proposal of the Y.C.L. on the united front. But recently the Young Socialists have given up their old positions and in principle have agreed to the organization of the united front. But ever since the formation of the Y.C.L., it has fought firmly and unceasingly for the formation of the united front of struggle of the working youth, and has not abandoned its opinion but on the contrary has carried them out on the whole in practice in a number of places in the country in which, moreover, the Young Socialist organizations have associated themselves with the proposals of the Y.C.L. and have accepted them.

Not much has to be said of the anarchist youth. Their honest supporters, more than ever before, are now leaving their anarchist-fascist leaders who have led the working class several times to putsches and

defeats, while recently they have bowed down to reaction and treacherously betrayed thousands of the working and toiling youth fighting in the armed struggle.

It can be seen from the above that while the Young Socialists (despite the heroism with which the majority of their members fought in the October battles) and the anarchist youth are wavering and feeling uncertain as to their political position, the Y.C.L. of Spain is firmly holding to its policy, its principles, which are brilliantly confirmed in the whole development of the revolution in Spain. Now, after the armed struggle, the gulf separating the courageous Young Socialists who fought like lions in Asturias

and other districts of the country, from Olenhauer, and the whole of the leadership of the Young Socialist International who refused to help the Spanish revolutionaries, has deepened as never before. The gulf separating the whole of the youth and in particular the anarchist working youth from the treacherous leaders in the F.A.I.* and the C.N.T.** and the whole of the disorganizing petty-bourgeois theory of anarchism, is deeper than ever before. The positions of the Y.C.L. are stronger than ever they were before.

* Federation of anarchists in Iberia.

** National Confederation of Labor, directed by the anarchists.

THE NEW "EMERGENCY LAW" IN THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

By W.

IN an inconspicuous place in the columns of the Brussels paper, the *Peuple*, the organ of Vandervelde, the Chairman of the Second International, an official communique was published on November 20 regarding the last session of the Executive Committee of the Second International. It was at this very session that 18 speakers "energetically" discussed for four days the question of the united front which had been put point blank before them, and as a result "unanimous" advice was given the sections of this international: "We give you our fatherly counsel to do as you like". In this communique there is a small paragraph which deserves some attention. This paragraph says:

"The Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the report made by de Brooker on behalf of the Commission of Three appointed by the Executive Committee to study the *organizational problems of the Socialist Parties working in illegal conditions*. On the basis of this report it was decided to *reduce the representation of these parties at the Congress of the Socialist and Labor International and its Executive Committee.*"

Thus the only decision made by the Executive Committee of the Second International on the "organizational problems of illegal parties" was to drive some of their representatives out of its ranks. At the very moment when the fascist government of Spain, stained with the blood of tens of thousands of workers, including Socialists, is handing victims over to a field court martial, including, among others, Largo Caballero, a member of the Executive Committee of the Second International, and is driving the Spanish Socialist Party into illegality, this Executive Committee cannot find a more urgent task than

to reduce the illegal parties to the position of "second rate citizens"!

And this is quite logical. It is not so long ago since the Chairman of the Second International, in characterizing the make-up of his Executive Committee, emphasized that it consisted almost entirely of past, present and future ministers.

The Second International bases itself in principle on *bourgeois legality*. In the name of this principle, the governments in which the Social-Democrats have participated or which they have supported have, in Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, and even in Spain itself, thrown tens of thousands of Communist workers into prison, and have driven the Communist Party underground. In the name of this principle of bourgeois legality, the Social-Democratic leaders in almost all countries where fascism is advancing have paralyzed the struggle of the workers, have cleared the path for the fascist dictatorship, hoping that as a mark of gratitude this dictatorship would spare them, tolerate them, and permit them to enjoy a legal existence for a more successful struggle against the Communists.

But matters turned out differently. Triumphant fascism, vested with the full confidence of big capital, and with no desire to share either its power or its influence with the bankrupt Social-Democratic lackeys of the bourgeoisie, suppressed the Social-Democratic Parties also in a number of countries. A number of members of the Executive Committee, including (alas!) ex-ministers, have turned out to be emigrants and seek the right of asylum in the capacity of poor relations in countries where the government includes Social-Democratic ministers.

They might have put up with this. Hitherto, in the Executive Committee of the Second International

there have been a good number of other emigrants—Russian-Mensheviks, S.R.'s, Georgian and Ukrainian S.D.'s, and Armenian nationalists—sitting as representatives of their "illegal parties", and this did not in the least shock their dignified colleagues. No one proposed to cut down the number of their representatives although everyone knew perfectly well that the "parties" they "represented" were fictitious. On the contrary, it was precisely because these people were out-and-out counter-revolutionaries, sworn enemies of the Soviet Union and Communism, representing only themselves and were absolutely independent of the real sentiments and wishes of the workers, that the big moguls of the Second International considered it useful to drag them from their middens and clothe them with all kinds of "rights". On such a basis, Welshes and Bauers could be tolerated in any quantity.

But they were not the people who mattered. In those Western-European countries where the Social-Democratic Parties have been suppressed by fascism, a process of radicalization that cannot be restrained is taking place among the Social-Democratic workers who are trying to restore their organizations in underground conditions.

The wall built by their ex-leaders for tens of

years to isolate the Social-Democratic workers from the Communist workers is breaking down.

The striving of the workers towards a joint struggle, towards the fighting united front, is growing. The emigrant leaders, whose role in paving the path to the fascist dictatorship is becoming ever clearer, are using the last vestiges of their influence, and the "mandates" are becoming very plainly fictitious.

And the dignitaries who constitute the Executive Committee of the Second International can already see the danger of the fine day when they will find themselves face to face not with the Welshes and Bauers but with genuine representatives of those sections of the Social-Democratic workers who are carrying on a *real* struggle hand in hand with the Communists against the fascists.

This is why the Executive Committee of the Second International has made haste to decree its emergency law against the illegal parties as a line of defense against the inroads of the "undesirable" elements.

Our comrades who are working in the countries against which this emergency law is directed must make it widely known among the Social-Democratic workers, and explain its meaning and significance.

THE ROLE OF SWEDISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

By M. M.

FOR two years the leaders of Swedish Social-Democracy have been sitting "at the royal table" and have been conducting the governmental affairs of the Swedish bourgeoisie and big landlords. When occasion arises, their Social-Democratic excellencies like to remind one that the financial barons have every reason to be fully satisfied with the Per Albin Hanson government. From time to time some big capitalist newspaper gives the Social-Democratic ministers the satisfaction of openly recognizing that no bourgeois government could have looked after the interests of Swedish capitalism better during the period of crisis than the Hanson Social-Democratic government.

The Social-Democratic government helped the bourgeoisie to pass all the burdens of the crisis over to the shoulders of the toiling masses, without any great internal convulsions, when the crisis passed into a depression of a peculiar type. By raising prices and increasing taxes, this government considerably reduced real wages which had already been reduced to the greatest degree during the crisis. At the same time, the government, in close collaboration with the party of the big agrarians, gave enormous subsidies

to the landlords. Bennerstrem, formerly a pacifist and now War Minister, is energetically carrying out plans for the armament of Swedish imperialism. The most prominent Social-Democrats—employees of the War Ministry—are passing through accelerated courses of military training so as to be able to master properly all the details of modern warfare and fulfill the tasks set by the military clique with a proper "knowledge of the business". Inspired by Great Britain, the foreign policy of Sweden, which despite all the beautiful gestures of Mr. Sandler is directed against the Soviet Union, should satisfy the most hard-boiled conservatives. It would seem that the Swedish bourgeoisie could not wish for anything better.

However, they do want more. They want the form taken by their power in this "classical" country of bourgeois democracy to correspond to the "signs of the times", so that they can bring about the fascization of the State as far as possible along a lawful path.

The government of Mr. Per Albin Hanson has been using every effort for many months to carry out this task set by its masters as well. It has pre-

pared the law on "anti-State societies", which is directed towards the suppression of the Communist Party. It has raised the armed fascist detachments, hitherto illegal, to the rank of State reserve police. At the present time it is taking determined steps along the path of fascization, undertaking an attack on the trade unions, unprecedented in Swedish conditions, with a view to paralyzing their fighting powers in the future. We have in view the notorious law on the "Rights of the Third Person" which exclude all possibilities of political strikes and sympathy strikes and give the protection of the law to the strike-breakers ("the third person"). The boycott of strike-breakers and any action directed against them will be prohibited. The sanction of the central trade union bodies will be necessary before a strike can be declared in the localities. If a strike is declared, trade union functionaries will be subjected to police surveillance. The bourgeois government previously tried to pass such a law. This attempt broke down in face of the firm resistance of the workers. The Social-Democratic government has now very willingly taken this task on itself.

This spring, a government commission prepared a draft of this compulsory law with the consent of the leaders of the trade union executive, which met the requirements of all the above-mentioned demands of the bourgeoisie. It is true that in view of the widespread protest movements caused by this bill among the working class, the government was forced to resort to a maneuver, and at the last moment to soften down the bill proposed by the commission in a few points. The essence of the first draft, however, was kept in the second draft. It only remains now for the bourgeois majority of the Reichstag to reject these few amendments introduced to decorate the bill.

The news of the heroic struggle of the Spanish proletariat burst like a bomb in the midst of this idyll of harmony between the bourgeois and Social-Democratic leaders. Hitherto, Hanson and Co. had been able to explain the revolutionary struggles of the working class in other countries as "Bolshevik machinations", and had assured their masters that Social-Democracy and its International were not concerned at all with these "crimes", and even frowned on them. But now it was impossible to deny that broad masses of *Social-Democratic* workers had also undertaken an armed struggle against fascism and that the Spanish Social-Democratic Party, under the pressure of these masses, had been forced to consent to a united front with the Communists. The Swedish bourgeois press immediately seized on this fact and demanded that the ruling Social-Democratic Party should sharply repudiate this "unprecedented" action of its Spanish colleagues which "compromised" Swedish Social-Democracy.

The Social-Democratic press reacted to this with-

out delay. The chief organ of Mr. Per Albin Hanson, the Social-Democratic paper *Nyu Tid*, published in Hetebourg, gave vent to bitter complaints at the Spanish Socialist Party which had "drawn" the Social-Democratic working masses "along the path of Bolshevism", and read it the following wise admonition:

"The Spanish Socialists could, in collaboration with the bourgeois radical, have brought about the peaceful and fruitful development of the young republic. In this regard they could have based themselves on one of the most democratic constitutions in Europe. But they absolutely threw this chance aside, and as a result, a tragedy took place both for the country and for its labor movement."

When the telegram of greeting of the Second International to the Spanish Socialist Party became known, their Social-Democratic excellencies finally gave vent to all their spleen. How could the leaders of the Second International, in spite of their maneuvers with ministers' portfolios, take so little account of the Swedish Social-Democrats? The well-known Social Democratic leader, Allan Vogt, poured out his feelings in the Social-Democratic paper *Arbeidet*, published in Nalma:

"Such greetings were out of place and were too hasty In addition, it is no duty of the International to encourage the parties of separate countries in any way when they are on a path which diverges from that sketched out by the International.

"How can it be that in Zurich they do not finally try to realize what fatal results such actions have in other countries? This telegram breathes the spirit of the pure, naive barricade fights of last century.

"Here in the north the impression is growing stronger and stronger that the International has fallen under the influence of emigrant circles whose position in respect to socialism and the working class movement differs fundamentally from the position of Social-Democracy in those countries where it is full of strength. We deeply sympathize with the fate of the emigrants, but we are decisively against the leadership of the International acting under the influence of unfortunate events in Europe, as if the understanding of democratic methods in principle had become different and as if there were not definite decisions adopted in an organized manner." (My italics—M.M.)

The proposal made to the Second International by the Comintern, regarding the organization of joint activity on the basis of the united front for the support of the fighting workers of Spain, greatly disturbed the leaders of Swedish Social-Democracy. They sharply condemned the very fact of the negotiations of Vandervelde and Adler with Cachin and Thorez. The newspaper *Nyu Tid* shouted:

"The negotiations of Vandervelde and Adler with Cachin and Thorez in Brussels were carried

on without the consent of the Bureau of the Socialist and Labor Internationals."

At the same time the paper blurted out the information that the Central Committee of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party, along with its fellow thinkers in certain other countries, intended to organize a fraction in the Second International so as to use the threat of a split to strike a good blow at the "emigrant leadership" and direct the policy of the Second International according to the desires of this fraction.

"On this question a lively exchange of opinions has taken place during the last few days with the Social-Democratic Parties of Denmark, Holland and Great Britain. These parties, like Swedish Social-Democracy, are strongly opposed to even a mere meeting being held with Moscow. It is impossible for the Socialist and Labor International to make a decision on this question in defiance of the desires of its strongest and most influential parties. . . . The French and Austrians, with their favorable attitude to the 'united front', will probably find themselves alone in the leading circles of the International. At the session of the Bureau of the International, together with its Executive Committee, in Paris in November, the report of Vandervelde and Adler will undoubtedly be simply shelved. No other decision can be taken without a serious risk for the stability of the Socialist International."

Such was the statement of the newspaper *Nyu Tid*, and a few days later, for the sake of clarity, it added:

"Here and there the Swedish bourgeois press has sounded the alarm regarding the negotiations of Vandervelde and Adler with the lackeys of the Comintern [!]. We, together with our Party comrades in Denmark, Holland and Great Britain, consider that Vandervelde and Adler have taken on themselves an utterly fruitless labor. . . . One thing is true—if any kind of 'united front' with Moscow is established, it will be done without the Social-Democratic Parties of Sweden, Denmark and Holland, and the International will have to choose between these parties and Moscow."

This was an open threat of a split.

On October 24, the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden officially de-

cided to reject "any co-operation whatever with the Communist International or with any of its sections"

"The representatives of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party in the Socialist International will most definitely oppose the proposal for joint actions by the two Internationals irrespective of whether this is a general agreement or occasional cooperation."

The proposal of the C.C. of the C.P. of Sweden to organize joint action on a national scale in support of the Spanish workers engaged in intense struggle had been rejected a few days previously.

It is true that the Stockholm *Social Demokratem* shed crocodile tears about the "unfortunate impossibility" of the unity of action of the working class, but on the whole took up the same position as the Getebourg leading organ of Social-Democracy which sets the general tone. Nevertheless, in Stockholm, where the Communist Party renegades, Heglund and Strom, have been at the head of the S.D. organization since 1924, it was considered advisable, in view of the feelings of the workers, to express the point of view of the Social-Democratic leaders in a somewhat less cynical form. And they had every ground for doing this.

The basic masses of the members of the Social-Democratic Party are not at all pleased at the policy of their party and the government. After the last elections, where the vast majority of the workers voted for Social-Democracy, there have been elections in Getebourg, where, in addition to the weakening of all the bourgeois parties, Social-Democracy suffered considerable losses, but, as against this, the Communist Party gained and trebled its vote.

Hundreds of thousands of members of trade unions, the majority of whom belonged to the Social-Democratic Party, have already made a sharp protest against the law on trade unions. The Young Socialist League is more and more insistently demanding that the government introduce socialist measures. Inside the Social-Democratic Party oppositional feelings are growing stronger and stronger against the policy of its leaders, who reject unity of action with the Communists and at the same time work hand and hand with reaction. The speed with which this process takes place and the extent to which these feelings can be directed along the correct path depends, in the main, on the work of our Party.